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AUDIT COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT OF FRAUD RISK 
by 
Robert M. Wilbanks 
 
This study examines how audit committees (ACs) fulfill their responsibilities for 
assessing fraudulent financial reporting (FFR) risk by focusing on the social 
influence/risk aversion relationship. Although the AC’s responsibility for assessing FFR 
risk is arguably one of its most important roles, ACs lack consensus on how to perform 
the task of fraud risk oversight. This study explores this issue at a deeper level by 
examining the relationship between the AC’s fraud risk assessment process and the 
professional and personal ties that exist between AC members and (a) management (CEO 
and CFO), and (b) other corporate governance actors (internal audit, external audit, other 
AC members, and other independent directors).  
The results of a survey of 136 AC members from mid-sized U.S. public 
companies indicate no association between AC members’ personal or professional 
relationship ties to management or other corporate governance actors and AC members’ 
overall reliance on these actors to assess fraud risk. However, I find links between the 
AC’s own actions to assess fraud risk and (a) personal ties to the CEO/CFO and 
professional ties to other corporate governance actors, and (b) certain control variables 
including board of director independence, AC size, and respondent gender. Specifically, I 
find that AC members with personal ties to the CEO and other independent directors, and 





AC actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. On the other hand, I find 
that AC members with personal ties to the CFO, and professional ties to other 
independent directors and the head of internal audit, are more likely to engage in actions 
to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. Further, I find that female AC 
members are more likely to report engaging in activities to assess management’s 
integrity. I also find that AC size and board independence are positively associated with 
AC actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. In addition, the results 
provide insights about how AC members delegate their fraud oversight duties, and reveal 
that AC members generally perceive that management, and internal and external auditors, 
are more responsible for assessing fraud risk than the AC, or other independent directors. 
This study should be of interest to regulators, researchers and other groups concerned 
with management-director relationship ties, AC composition, director independence, and 
AC oversight issues.  
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 The audit committee (AC) plays a key role in protecting investors from fraudulent 
financial reporting (FFR), but ACs lack consensus on how to perform the task of fraud 
risk oversight (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009). Regulators and other 
stakeholders have high expectations of ACs and “the abilities of ACs to meet their 
responsibilities” (Bédard & Gendron, 2010, p. 175). However, AC members’ social or 
professional connection to management or other directors “raises questions about the 
degree of arms-length monitoring that may take place” (Beasley et al., 2009, p. 81). The 
extant academic research examining AC relationship ties is very limited and primarily 
archival in nature. In light of the regulatory expectations that the AC will provide 
substantive fraud oversight, and the risk that relationship ties “may impair the ability of 
AC members to be substantively independent of management” (e.g., Cohen, Gaynor, 
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2011, p. 129), and the lack of related academic research 
examining AC judgments, my research provides insight into the association between AC 
fraud risk oversight and AC relationship ties.   
 Specifically, I examine variations in the AC’s approach to assessing FFR risk and 
how this variation is related to AC members’ personal and professional ties and other 
characteristics of the AC and its members. The study complements recent archival and 
experimental studies that have examined management-board relationship ties and 





Beasley et al.’s (2009, p. 114) call for future research examining whether AC members  
“view of delegated fraud oversight impacts audit committee effectiveness”; (b) 
Bruynseels and Cardinael’s (2012, p. 35) call for future research “examining AC 
relationships and AC interactions with other actors who influence the quality of financial 
reporting”; and (c) Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy and Wright’s (2011, p. 145) call for 
research “examining whether professional or personal ties have the most influence on 
potentially compromising the substantive independence of the AC”. As such, the study 
begins to shed light on the issue of whether regulators should consider requiring directors 
to disclose their personal ties or lack thereof, in addition to the mandated disclosures of 
familial and financial interests to the firm or the CEO/CFO (SOX, 2002). This type of 
disclosure may be of interest to external parties, such as auditors, regulators, or investors, 
who may perceive that the AC is more independent if its members do not have personal 
or professional ties to management.  
 In this study, I administer a survey developed, in part, from the results of Beasley 
et al. (2009) to measure the constructs. I capture AC members’ perceptions of their 
relationship ties to management and other corporate governance actors and AC members’ 
reliance on these parties. I also capture how these relationships are associated with the 
AC’s own efforts to assess FFR risk and management integrity. Specifically, my 
dependent variables are: (a) AC members’ reliance on the CEO and CFO to assess FFR 
risk, (b) AC members’ reliance on other corporate governance actors to assess FFR risk, 
and (c) AC members’ reliance on their own actions to assess FFR risk. My independent 
variables are: (a) AC members’ perceptions of their personal ties to the CEO and CFO, 





members’ perceptions of their personal ties to other corporate governance actors, and (d) 
AC members’ perceptions of their professional ties to other corporate governance actors. 
Further, I consider several corporate governance variables that are of interest in studies of 
relationship ties including AC expertise, director tenure, CEO power, and AC members’ 
perceptions of responsibility. I also measure a host of other personal and governance 
variables including, but not limited to, AC meeting frequency, AC members’ education 
and experience, AC size, board independence, board size, and multiple board positions 
(e.g., “busy directors”). 
 Using agency theory (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
institutional theory (e.g., Scott, 1987), managerial hegemony theory (e.g., Kosnik, 1987), 
and accountability theory (e.g., Jensen, 2006; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Messier & 
Quilliam, 1992; Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock 1985 a, b), I anticipate that variations in AC 
members’ strategies to assess FFR risk will reflect how the social influence/risk aversion 
dynamic influences members’ sense of accountability and whether that accountability lies 
with those who serve as agents of the firm (e.g., management) or those who work on 
behalf of external stakeholders (e.g., internal audit, external audit, other AC members, 
other independent board members). Consistent with the managerial hegemony 
perspective and institutional theory and the findings in several archival studies that 
concluded that social ties are corrosive and diminish the quality of corporate governance 
(e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran, Kedia, & Prabhala, 2012; Dey & 
Liu, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012), I expect to find that stronger personal ties 
between management (e.g., CEO and CFO) and AC members will lead to greater AC 





to assess FFR risk. However, consistent with agency theory and the “collaborative board” 
model (e.g., Westphal, 1999) and the findings of other recent archival studies by 
Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2012) and Chidambaran, et al. (2012) that differentiated 
between personal and professional ties and found that professional ties were associated 
with good corporate governance outcomes, I expect that this relationship will be less 
strong for AC members with professional ties than those with personal ties. On the other 
hand, consistent with accountability theory, I expect that AC members’ perceptions of 
their personal and professional ties to other corporate governance actors (e.g., internal 
audit, external audit, other AC members, and other independent directors) can lead to 
either greater or lesser reliance on other corporate governance actors, the CEO/CFO, and 
the AC members’ own efforts, as there are competing arguments based on the concepts of 
inter-rater reliability and self-insight.   
 The relationships between the AC and the other corporate actors in the corporate 
governance mosaic (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004) who directly influence the 
quality of corporate governance (e.g., management, internal audit, external audit, board 
of directors) are complex, and AC members’ abilities to carry out their duties depend on 
AC members’ access to information, as well as AC members’ capabilities and 
motivations, and the capabilities and motivations of management and the other corporate 
governance actors. Accountability theory suggests that AC members should be more 
highly motivated in the presence of other corporate governance actors to assess FFR risk 
because assessing FFR risk is a difficult task and stakeholders or those who collectively 
work on behalf of the stakeholders have high expectations of the AC. However, AC 





reputation and social capital could lead to widely varying strategies for assessing FFR 
risk. As such, I expect that AC members’ relationship ties to management or other 
corporate governance actors directly responsible for the quality of corporate governance 
may help foster mutual trust and advice giving, but can also lead to more self-reliant 
behavior depending upon the nature of the relationship ties.  
 Overall, I find no association between AC members’ personal or professional 
relationship ties to management or other corporate governance actors and AC members’ 
overall reliance on these actors to assess fraud risk. However, I do find links between the 
AC’s own actions to assess fraud risk and (a) personal ties to the CEO/CFO and 
professional ties to other corporate governance actors, and (b) certain control variables 
including board of director independence, AC size, and respondent gender. These 
findings suggest that some AC members, regardless of relationship type, may serve in 
largely ceremonial roles and/or serve as passive directors who derive their information 
from management, consistent with institutional theory and managerial hegemony theory. 
On the other hand, I find evidence that some AC members are more likely to take an 
agency approach to AC fraud oversight. Some of these AC members appear to engage in 
non-confrontational strategies for assessing FFR risk, possibly to protect their personal 
status, or to adhere to communal board norms, yet still carry out their fiduciary 
responsibilities, consistent with accountability theory.     
 This study contributes to the growing body of research examining AC relationship 
ties. First, this study provides additional insight into how AC members delegate their 
fraud oversight responsibilities. Second, unlike prior archival research, this study 





drive AC judgments rather than indirectly examining how relationship ties are associated 
with AC outputs (e.g., financial reporting quality and corporate governance outcomes). 
Third, the study provides a broader, network view of relationship ties than found in 
previous archival studies by examining not only AC relationship ties to CEOs and CFOs, 
but other corporate actors (e.g., internal audit, external audit, board of directors) directly 
involved in corporate governance, as well. Finally, this study contributes to an emerging 
line of research that considers different forms of relationship ties (e.g. Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidbambaran et al., 2012; Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy, & 







 This study examines the social influence/risk aversion relationship in a unique 
setting by examining how AC members handle their responsibilities for assessing FFR 
risk. Using a survey of AC members from U.S. public companies, I take a broader, 
network view of the corporate governance process consistent with that of Turley and 
Zaman (2007) by examining how personal and professional ties between the AC and the 
full network of actors in the corporate governance mosaic (Cohen et al., 2004) are 
associated with variations in AC members’ approaches to fraud oversight. Specifically, I 
examine how AC members’ perceptions of their personal and professional ties to the 
CEO, the CFO, the head of internal audit, the external audit partner in charge of the 
engagement, and other independent directors are associated with AC members’ 
perceptions of reliance when assessing FFR risk and the AC’s own actions to assess fraud 
risk.  
 In this study, I have also broadened the definitions of personal and professional 
ties to capture ties that have not been included in previous archival studies. Specifically, I 
define personal ties as “instances where you and another individual have non-business 
affiliations or interactions.” I include relationships commonly found in prior studies of 
“social” or “personal” ties including military service, mutual alma mater, and 
memberships in social clubs and charitable organizations (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 





2012; Krishnan et al., 2011). However, I also include personal friendships, neighborhood 
friendships, church memberships, and a catchall category. I have also broadened the 
definition of “professional ties” which I define as “instances where individuals interact in 
a business capacity in a meaningful way separate from board and AC service.” I include 
relationship ties included in prior studies of “professional” ties including past 
employment (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012) and shared 
board responsibilities (Cohen et al., 2012a). However, I also include supplier-customer 
relationships, common membership in professional organizations, and service on not-for-
profit boards, consistent with Beasley et al. (2009) and Lisic, Neal, and Zhang (2012). I 
also allow the study’s participants to describe their relationship ties as a catchall 
provision.  
 I also examine the influence of a host of other AC, governance, personal, and 
company characteristics in my analysis that are pertinent to studies of relationship ties 
including: (1) AC expertise (e.g., Cohen et al., 2012b; Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy, 
& Wright, 2008a; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002, 2010; Dhaliwal, Naiker, & 
Navissi, 2010), (2) director tenure (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Sharma & Iselin, 2012; 
Vafeas, 2003), (3) CEO power (e.g., Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2011; 
Lisic et al., 2012, Stevenson & Radin, 2009), and (4) AC members’ perceptions of their 
responsibilities (e.g., Abdolmohammadi & Levy, 1992; DeZoort, 1997; Wolnizer, 1995). 
For the dependent variables of AC members’ reliance on management and other 





 from Beasley et al. (2009) and measures from Bierstaker, Cohen, DeZoort, and 
Hermanson (2012) and Cohen et al. (2012a). My conceptual model is shown in Figure 
1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 Conceptual Research Model 
Audit committees are charged with overseeing financial reporting and audit 
processes in U.S. public companies (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 1999; New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 2004; Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 2002). Scandals in the 
pre-SOX era (e.g., Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco International, and WorldCom) 
demonstrated that corporate governance could be compromised, resulting in FFR. Among 
the provisions of SOX (2002), section 407 required companies to disclose that all 
members of the AC are independent and that at least one member of the AC meets the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) definition of a “financial expert”, and if 





“financial expertise” led to an ongoing controversy as to the appropriate mix of director 
expertise on the AC. However, the clear intent of both SOX (2002) and the SEC was to 
improve AC oversight.  
In response to the regulatory changes, firms sought out potential AC members 
who could not only enhance the quality of “human capital” (e.g., Stevenson & Radin, 
2009) on the board, but could also cope with heightened scrutiny by the public and 
regulators, large workload demands, and reputation and liability risks (Sharma & Iselin, 
2012). Not surprisingly, management and boards of directors appear to have looked 
towards individuals with whom they had existing social or professional affiliations (e.g., 
Beasley et al., 2009; Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran, et al., 2012; Clune, 
Hermanson, Tompkins, & Ye, 2013; Dey & Liu, 2011; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 
2009, 2012; Krishnan et al., 2011) to improve corporate governance because comfort and 
trust are associated with established relationships (Clune, et al., 2013). Beasley et al. 
(2009) quote an AC member who described the selection process: 
The CFO suggested that I join the board. The CFO is a personal friend. 
Long ago I served on the company’s audit engagement (35 years ago). The 
CFO wanted my financial expertise. (Quote from a NASDAQ audit 
committee chair (joined board post-SOX). (p. 81) 
 
Personal ties between management and the board members can facilitate the due 
diligence process (related to joining a board) by providing comfort to prospective 
members, as well as to management and existing board members (Beasley et al., 2009; 
Clune et al., 2013). Each party has knowledge of the other, which can facilitate 
collegiality and trust. Beasley et al. (2009) documented that prospective AC members 
demonstrate skepticism and risk aversion when considering board service and are “more 





have concerns about management credibility and/or integrity or have witnessed fraud, 
illegal acts, or unethical conduct” (Beasley et al., 2009, p. 80). Research has also 
confirmed that relationship ties can lead to more frequent and higher quality advice 
giving between CEOs and outside directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Westphal, 1999), 
enhanced board involvement and firm performance (Westphal, 1999), less earnings 
management (Krishnan et al., 2011), and improved financial reporting quality, “but only 
if social ties include members of the AC” (Hoitash, 2011, p. 399). This concept, referred 
to as the “collaborative board” model (Westphal, 1999), suggests that board members are 
capable of being both monitors of, and advice givers to, management.  
On the other hand, the appointment of socially connected directors to the board 
potentially has a downside risk. Academic research has documented that social ties 
between managers and directors are associated with adverse accounting or governance 
outcomes (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey and Liu, 
2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012). Further, research has found that powerful CEOs can 
undermine AC expertise (Lisic et al., 2012); trump the addition of AC members that 
bring additional “human capital” to the board (Stevenson & Radin, 2009); and weaken 
the intensity of board monitoring (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). However, more recent studies 
have found that management-director professional ties are positively associated with 
good corporate governance outcomes (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012) and lower fraud 
probability (Chidambaran et al., 2012). In addition, a recent experiment with non- 
professional investors found that investors perceived that ACs with members with 
professional ties to management were more effective than ACs with members with social 





members with no ties to management were more independent than either ACs with 
members with personal or professional ties. These findings suggest that ACs with no ties, 
or professional ties to management, may be associated with more effective AC oversight 
than ACs with social ties. 
The central issue associated with management-director relationship ties is whether 
management has sought to place technically independent, yet socially compromised 
individuals on the board of directors as a way of controlling the board and circumventing 
the intent of stricter governance regulations. By controlling socially dependent directors, 
management may be capable of more easily perpetrating FFR. This scenario is potentially 
problematic as Beasley, Carcello, & Hermanson (1999) and Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson & Neal (2010) found that CEOs and CFOs are named for some level of 
involvement in the vast majority of FFR cases. The importance of understanding the link 
between management-director relationship ties and the AC’s assessment of FFR risk is 
underscored by a finding that the costs associated with incidences of FFR have increased 
rapidly in recent years (Beasley et al., 2010).  
Another key issue is whether AC members are capable of effectively assessing 
FFR risk. Beasley et al. (2009, p. 98) documented that “many AC members simply did 
not want to be responsible for detecting fraud” and “lacked consensus” as how to best 
assess FFR risk. Further, Beasley et al. (2009) found that some AC members perceived 
that internal and external auditors were primarily responsible for fraud risk oversight. As 
such, these findings raised questions about AC accountability. Although, the BRC’s 
(1999) “guiding principles” for ACs encouraged collaborations between the AC and 





of duties by AC members can potentially be problematic if management is capable of 
influencing either AC members or the other corporate governance monitors (e.g., internal 
audit, external audit, other board members). This is an important issue because regulators 
and other stakeholders have high expectations of ACs and “the abilities of ACs to meet 
their responsibilities” (Bédard & Gendron, 2010, p. 175).  
 The present study is primarily motivated by (1) Beasley et al.’s (2009) findings 
that AC members generally lacked a recognized responsibility for fraud risk oversight, 
yet AC members play a key role as monitors of the firm (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2011); (2) 
prior research finding that board oversight is weakened in the presence of “social ties” 
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & 
Tate, 2012; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012) despite regulatory independence rules; (3) recent 
research findings that the appointment of directors with “professional” ties (Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012), especially those serving on the AC 
(Hoitash, 2011), can lead to effective corporate governance or offset the corrosive 
influence of “social ties” (Krishnan et al., 2011), but there is limited research addressing 
this issue; and (4) AC “black box” studies (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron & Bédard, 
2006; Gendron, Bédard & Gosselin, 2004) that document the presence of management-
director relationship ties, but have not specifically examined the association between 
these ties and AC judgments. By using a survey, rather than an archival approach, I am 
able to more directly examine these issues by examining the relationship between the 
AC’s fraud risk assessment process and the professional and personal ties that exist 
between AC members and (a) management (CEO and CFO) and (b) other corporate 





 This study also complements recent archival and experimental studies that have 
examined management-board relationship ties and corporate governance outputs 
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran, et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Hoitash, 
2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan, et al., 2011) and investor judgments (Cohen, 
et al., 2012a). Further, the study addresses (a) Beasley et al.’s (2009, p. 114) call for 
future research whether AC members “view of delegated fraud oversight impacts audit 
committee effectiveness”; (b) Bruynseels & Cardinael’s (2012, p. 35) call for future 
research “examining AC relationships and AC interactions with other actors who 
influence the quality of financial reporting”; and (c) Cohen et al.’s (2011, p. 145) call for 
research “examining whether professional or personal ties have the most influence on 
potentially compromising the substantive independence of the AC”. As such, this study 
begins to shed light on the issue of whether regulators should consider requiring directors 
to disclose their personal ties or lack thereof, in addition to the mandated disclosures of 
familial and financial interests to the firm or the CEO/CFO (SOX, 2002). This type of 
disclosure may be of interest to external parties, such as auditors, regulators, or investors, 
who may perceive that the AC is more independent if its members have no personal or 
professional ties to management.   
Because of the complex interactions among the actors in the corporate governance 
mosaic, I follow calls by Carcello, et al. (2011a), Clune et al. (2013), Cohen, Gaynor, 
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright (2008b), Bédard & Gendron (2010), and Radcliffe (2010), 
among others, and use multiple theoretical lenses to explain behavior that none of the 
four major governance theories (e.g., agency, resource dependence, institutional, 





incorporate elements of agency theory, managerial hegemony, institutional theory, and 
accountability theory to explain why AC members may provide substantive monitoring 
or instead serve in largely ceremonial roles. Agency theory views the AC as an 
independent monitor of management (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976); however, the managerial hegemony perspective suggests that director 
independence may be compromised by social influences and that CEO influence over the 
selection of board members may render the board passive by the appointment of friends 
and individuals with whom management shares personal ties. Thus, independent directors 
may serve in largely ceremonial roles (e.g., institutional theory). On the other hand, the 
“collaborative board” model (e.g., Westphal, 1999) suggests that management-director 
relationship ties may enhance advice seeking and advice giving behavior. Westphal 
(1999, p. 9) noted that the larger literature on advice-seeking has found that advice 
seekers’ concern for their status is “a primary inhibitor to seeking advice”. As such, 
social ties and arguably professional ties help to alleviate management, as well as 
directors’, concerns about status by facilitating trust (Hoitash, 2011; Westphal, 1999).  
 Accountability theory suggests that people are more likely to account for (or 
justify) their actions to themselves or others (Tetlock, 1985a) when held accountable by 
external audiences. In order for directors to provide effective monitoring and to be 
perceived as effective, they need to have an adequate understanding of the company on 
whose board they serve. Roberts, McNulty, & Styles (2005, p. S6) posit that directors 
create accountability on the board “through a series of different behaviors including 
challenging, questioning, testing, probing, debating, advising, and informing and that 





of directors, Jensen (2006) posits that directors’ concern for their status is driven by their 
sense of accountability. Thus, AC members may develop different strategies for assessing 
FFR risk depending on AC members’ perceptions of the strength of their own abilities 
(self-insight) and the abilities of other corporate governance actors (inter-rater reliability) 
in order to perceive that they are accountable and to maintain their status on the board.   
 Given the use of multiple theoretical lenses in this study and the wide array of 
relationships that I examine, I anticipate that survey participants’ perceptions of the 
strength of their personal and professional relationships to the CEO/CFO and other 
corporate governance actors will be associated with widely varying levels of reliance on 
these actors and the AC members’ own efforts to assess FFR risk. And, I expect that the 
results of the study will provide deeper insight into the relative strength of monitor-agent 
and monitor-monitor relationships.        
 The next sections provide a review of the pertinent literature and develop the 







Audit Committee Fraud Oversight 
Legal Environment and Audit Committee Risk  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was implemented in response to massive 
accounting scandals at companies such as Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco International, 
and WorldCom. SOX (2002) increased the AC’s responsibilities and authority (Section 
301), raised AC independence and expertise requirements (Section 407) and provided 
legal protection to “whistleblowers” of publicly traded companies who provided evidence 
of fraud. The stock exchanges (e.g., New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) also implemented a host of regulatory reforms. Although many in the 
business community argued that the costs associated with implementing SOX have 
outweighed the benefits (Wade, 2007), the findings in the academic literature have 
generally found that SOX led to improved corporate governance (see Carcello et al., 
2011a). Further, the global meltdown of the financial markets in late 2008 that 
necessitated governmental bailouts of failing companies (e.g., General Motors and 
Chrysler) and financial institutions (e.g., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG) indicated that 
additional regulations or refinements to existing regulations were perhaps warranted.  
In reaction to the high profile firm failures of late 2008, the U.S. Congress implemented 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank 
Act). The Dodd-Frank Act included extensive changes to U.S. financial regulations 





with incidences of FFR (Beasley et al., 2010), from benefiting financially from its actions 
and provided incentives to whistleblowers, who are more likely to discover fraudulent 
activity (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010). Among the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
Section 954 implemented a “claw back” provision that allowed firms to recoup 
compensation from executives in cases where it was later determined that accounting 
issues led to financial restatements (SEC, 2010). Further, Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act strengthened whistleblower rules to provide monetary compensation between 10% 
and 30% of any monetary sanctions above $1 million to employees who voluntarily 
provided original information about violations of securities or commodities laws (SEC, 
2010). The Dodd-Frank Act also enhanced protection to whistleblowers and implemented 
anti-retaliation rights (SEC, 2010). 
In addition, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) reacted 
by issuing a new standard that recognized the AC is a key communications hub among 
parties responsible for overseeing FFR risk. PCAOB Standard No. 16 “Communications 
with Audit Committees,” which is effective for public company audits of fiscal periods 
beginning after Dec. 15, 2012, formalizes and documents communications between ACs 
and external auditors (PCAOB, 2012). In general, the standard encourages more timely 
dialogue between external auditors and ACs regarding pertinent audit issues rather than 
waiting until the issuance of a financial report (PCAOB, 2012). Although PCAOB No. 16 
primarily emphasized communications between external auditors and ACs, it can be 
inferred that timely AC communication with other actors in the financial reporting chain 





 The costs to AC members for not providing proper fraud oversight can be 
significant. Directors are “now held more accountable than ever before and face legal 
liability, reputational risk, and possible SEC enforcement actions when FFR occurs” 
(Boyle, Wilbanks, & Hermanson, 2012, p. 4). For example, Cowen and Marcel (2011, p. 
524) found that board members identified with FFR are “subject to higher rates of 
dismissal from not only the boards where the improprieties occurred, but from other 
boards as well”. Srinivasan (2005) also found that director turnover of AC members is 
more likely as the severity of financial misstatements increases. Consistent with 
Srinivasan (2005), Fich and Shivdasani (2007, p. 335) found that the outside directors are 
“more likely to lose other board appointments when the severity of the fraud allegation is 
high, and when the outside director sits on the AC of an interlocked firm”. Further, there 
are spillover effects to other firms. Kang (2008) found that firm value decreases not only 
with a fraud firm, but also in other firms on whose board an interlocked director serves. 
The effect is even more pronounced when interlocking directors hold audit or governance 
chair positions in both firms (Kang, 2008).  
 Collectively, these studies documented that AC members are under heightened 
scrutiny to assess FFR risk and are accountable to a large network of individuals and 
groups, not only in the immediate financial reporting chain in any one firm on whose 
board the member serves, but also to a wider network of external stakeholders as well.  
As such, AC members must take into account “the expectations of these groups and the 
potential damage to their own personal and professional status when faced with uncertain 





audiences for their behavior” (Jensen, 2006, p. 122). Thus, it is important for “board 
members to better understand FFR and its likely perpetrators” (Boyle et al., 2012, p. 4). 
The Audit Committee and Accountability  
The AC plays a pivotal role in providing good corporate governance, but does not 
act alone in achieving this goal. Management, internal audit, external audit, and the board 
of directors also play direct roles in maintaining the quality of corporate governance. 
Other corporate governance actors and mechanisms (e.g., courts and the legal system, 
regulators, financial analysts, stock exchanges) who help to safeguard stakeholder 
interests, also play a prominent, yet less direct role, in shaping and influencing the 
behavior of those actors who are more directly associated with corporate governance 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2004). Collectively, Cohen et al. (2004, p. 90) described this 
assortment of actors as a “corporate governance mosaic”. Kalbers (2009) also suggested 
that other parties, whose losses associated with incidences of FFR are less easy to 
quantify, have a vested interest in good corporate governance as well. These parties 
include “employees, certain classes of stockholders and creditors, and smaller 
competitors” (p. 197).  
Beasley et al. (2009) documented that AC members generally approached AC 
service with a serious intent of providing effective oversight, consistent with agency 
theory. Likewise, Lorsch and MacIver (1989), in a pre-SOX study, documented that 
directors approached board service more seriously than in the past. However, Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989) also documented that directors lacked a strong consensus about 
accountabilities to various constituencies and avoided talking about the matter. In the 





are driven by a sense of accountability to any one corporate governance actor or other 
stakeholders. However, it is clear that AC members are faced with a challenge of 
balancing their need to follow communal board norms by not openly challenging 
management on difficult issues (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) and/or sense of obligation to 
support a CEO who may have favored their appointment to the board (Johnson, 
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993; Wade, O’Reilly & Chandratat, 1990), against the high 
expectations of regulators and other stakeholders (Bédard & Gendron, 2010). Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989) perhaps best describe this predicament: 
Modern directors face a different reality - one in which the ability to carry 
out their legally defined responsibilities is often impeded: one shaped not 
only by the directors’ psychological reasons for serving [on the board], but 
by limits on their time, by their understanding and their accountabilities, 
and by relationships among themselves and the CEO-chairman. (p. 6) 
 
Audit Committee Authority and Responsibilities 
 
 The scope of the AC’s role in the firm is generally dictated by a formal written 
charter; however, SOX (2002) dictated AC composition and AC regulatory duties. 
Among the provisions of SOX (2002), section 301 specifically required that ACs be 
composed of independent directors and be responsible for appointing (and firing) external 
auditors, setting external auditor compensation, overseeing the work of external auditors, 
engaging special counsel or experts as necessary, and resolving financial reporting 
disagreements between management and the external auditor (SOX, 2002). Collectively, 
Bédard and Gendron (2010, p. 193) group these responsibilities into “three categories: (1) 
oversight of external communications, (2) monitoring of the internal control system, and 





are subject to the scrutiny of many stakeholders. A line of research examining AC 
members and their responsibilities (e.g., Abdolmohammadi & Levy, 1992; DeZoort, 
1997; Rittenberg & Nair, 1993a; Rupley, Almer, & Philbrick, 2011; Wolnizer, 1995), as 
well as a line of literature examining AC resolutions of management-auditor disputes 
(Cohen et al., 2007; DeZoort, Hermanson, & Houston, 2003a, 2003b, 2008; DeZoort & 
Salterio, 2001), provides valuable insights into how AC members deal with difficult tasks 
and why AC members may lack consensus as to how to assess FFR risk (Beasley et al., 
2009). 
 The pre-SOX studies of AC responsibilities focused on AC directors’ expertise 
and perceptions of their abilities to carry out their responsibilities, finding a gap between 
members’ perceptions of their responsibilities and their assigned responsibilities. 
Specifically, DeZoort (1997) found that some members acknowledged that they did not 
possess adequate expertise in many oversight areas related to accounting, auditing, and 
the law. However, in the post-SOX era, AC members appeared to be more confident and 
largely perceived that elements of AC effectiveness were present in their firms (Rupley et 
al., 2011). External corporate governance monitors have a similar perception. Cohen et 
al. (2010) found that auditors perceived that ACs had become more effective in 
monitoring the financial reporting process in the post-SOX era. On the other hand, 
studies of AC resolutions of auditor-management disagreements have revealed mixed 
findings. Cohen et al. (2010) found that external auditors perceived that ACs still play a 
passive role in resolving disputes or are ineffective in resolving disputes. However, 
DeZoort et al. (2008, p. 85) found that AC support for an auditor‐proposed adjustment “is 





AC had become much more conservative post-SOX”. As such, the findings in these two 
lines of literature suggest that AC members employ different strategies to handle their 
responsibilities when faced with difficult or ambiguous tasks.  
 Still, there appears to be a consensus that ACs generally seek to provide quality 
corporate governance. For example, Gendron et al. (2004, p. 153) found that the ACs in 
their study “are generally perceived as effective by individuals who attend AC meetings” 
and that “key matters that AC members emphasize during meetings include financial 
statement accuracy and appropriate wording in financial reports, internal controls, and 
audit quality, and asks challenging questions of management and auditors”. Likewise, 
auditors perceived that “AC members are more likely to ask challenging questions of 
management in the post-SOX era” (Cohen et al. 2010, p. 768). However, AC members 
may or may not be willing to become involved in auditor-management disputes or are 
less likely to accept an auditor’s restatement recommendation than audit adjustment 
recommendation presumably because they are concerned about a loss of standing 
(Hunton & Rose, 2008).  
Audit Committee Strategies for Assessing Risk and Reputation risks 
 Hunton and Rose (2008) may help to explain why AC members have been found 
to be both active and passive in carrying out their responsibilities. The authors suggested 
that AC members may carry out their duties in a non-confrontational manner or act as a 
facilitator between management and auditors in order to maintain harmony on the board. 
This approach is consistent with the concept of a “collaborative board” (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2007; Westphal, 1999) whereby directors are an advice giver to, and monitor of, 





losing personal and professional capital by avoiding confrontation that could impair their 
status (Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Janis, 1982; Jensen, 2006; Johnson, Schnatternly, 
Bolton, & Tuggle, 2011) and lead to potentially being marginalized or ostracized by 
either management or other board members (Westphal & Khanna, 2003). On the other 
hand, AC members’ concern for reputation and litigation risks may result in enhanced 
monitoring. For example, Abbott, Park, and Parker (2000, p. 56) noted that although AC 
service can enhance directors’ reputation capital, it can exacerbate reputation damages if 
a financial restatement occurs while a director serves on an AC. Thus, AC members 
should be motivated to minimize this risk. Further, AC members may also be motivated 
by concerns about non-AC directors. Abbott et al. (2000) documented that in shareholder 
lawsuits alleging FFR, non-AC members could potentially seek to subrogate their 
liability to AC members by claiming reliance on the AC and thus, protect their own 
reputation capital. As such, the AC must take into account perceptions of both external 
stakeholders as well as the motivations of other corporate governance monitors.  
 FFR and the Role of Monitors and Agents of the Firm 
 Fraudulent financial reporting is defined “as the intentional material misstatement 
of financial statements or financial disclosures or the perpetration of an illegal act that has 
a material direct effect on the financial statements or financial disclosures” (Beasley et 
al., 1999, p. 11). Fraudulent financial reporting represents an extreme case of earnings 
management (Kalbers, 2009) where there is an intent to deceive (Dechow & Skinner, 
2000). Although FFR is the least prevalent of all types of fraud, the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners “Report to the Nations: 2010 Global Fraud Study” found a 





only difficult for the AC but other corporate governance monitors as well. Beasley et al. 
(2010, p. 6) documented that Big Six/Four external auditing firms, who arguably were 
best equipped to detect cases of FFR, audited 79% of the fraud companies in their study, 
but nearly all of the companies received unqualified or “clean” opinions. Although 
auditors were more likely to include additional explanatory language in opinions for 
fraud than for no-fraud firms, their inability to detect FFR reflected the challenge of 
detecting FFR. 
 The fraud literature reflects that corporate governance mechanisms have changed 
over time, yet some problems remain. In the pre-SOX era, academic research revealed 
that cases of FFR were often associated with (1) the lack of an AC prior to the fraud 
(Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; McMullen, 1996), (2) lower percentages of outside 
directors on the board of directors (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996), (3) shorter 
tenures of outside directors on the board and directors who served on other boards 
(Beasley, 1996), and (4) CEOs simultaneously serving as Chairman of the Board or 
CEOs being a firm’s founder (Dechow et al., 1996). Further, the Treadway Commission 
study (NCFFR, 1987), which examined cases of FFR for the five-year period ending 
August 1986, found that nearly two-thirds of fraud cases involved top management 
(NCFFR, 1987, p. 112). The ability of external auditors was also called into question as 
the Commission found that incidences of FFR were often linked “to the failure of 
external auditors to follow up on “red flags” during the audit process” (NCFFR, 1987, p. 
25).  
A subsequent 1999 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) sponsored 





1999), examined SEC enforcement actions against 200 companies and concluded that 
firms committing FFR often had weak boards of directors and ACs, and that top 
management was frequently involved with the fraud. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and 
Lapides (2000), in a related study of fraud and no-fraud companies in three key 
industries, also found that FFR was more prevalent in firms with very weak governance 
mechanisms, less independent ACs, and less independent boards. Further, the authors 
found that FFR was industry specific, with FFR being most common in the technology, 
healthcare, and financial services industries and that the methods for committing FFR 
differed by industry. Revenue recognition issues were more common in technology 
companies, whereas asset overstatements were more common in the financial services 
industry. This study also confirmed that there were significant differences between fraud 
and no-fraud firms in the pre-SOX era. Collectively, these studies painted a picture of 
fraud firms as being impaired by issues of management influence, a lack of director 
independence, weak ACs, little evidence of an internal audit function, and a challenging 
audit environment. 
 On the other hand, the more recent fraud literature suggested that improved 
corporate governance had led to better fraud oversight; however, management influence 
remained an issue. In a follow-up 2010 COSO-sponsored study, “Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting 1998-2007”; Beasley, et al. (2010) found that differences in board governance 
characteristics between fraud and no-fraud firms had been reduced or largely eliminated 
because of regulatory focus on governance and FFR. Further, companies appeared to 
place a greater emphasis on establishing additional monitoring mechanisms including the 





internal audit function increased from “20% of firms in the period of 1991-1999 to 50% 
of firms in a 2001-2004 sub period” (Beasley et al., 2010, p. 25).  
 However, Beasley et al. (2010) documented that many of the perpetrators of FFR, 
their methods for carrying out FFR, and the industries in which fraud occurred, had not 
changed despite increased regulatory focus on FFR. Further, the magnitude of losses 
associated with cases of FFR actually increased. Beasley et al. (2010) found that 
management was found to be increasingly associated with incidences of FFR, with CEOs 
and/or CFOs being named in 89% of the alleged cases of FFR in the 2010 COSO study as 
opposed to 83% in the 1999 COSO study. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
enforcement actions against CFOs also rose dramatically to 65% in the 2010 COSO 
study, as opposed to 43% in the 1999 COSO study, suggesting that CEOs might be 
pressuring more CFOs into committing FFR (see Feng, Ge, Luo, & Shevlin, 2011). 
Revenue recognition issues and the overstatement of asset valuations continued to be the 
most prevalent means of perpetrating FFR. And, cases of FFR continued to be industry 
focused, with approximately 63% of the cases of FFR being in the computer/hardware, 
other manufacturing, healthcare and health products, retailer/wholesaler, and financial 
services industries. These findings were similar to those found in Beasley et al. (1999), 
except that alleged cases of FFR in the computer and software and other manufacturing 
industries increased significantly from 24% to 40% in total. Perhaps the most disturbing 
finding was that the magnitude of the frauds increased from a mean fraud of $25 million 
per case in the 1999 study to $400 million per case in the 2010 study; however, the 





 Collectively, these findings are problematic when considered in the context of the 
AC’s assessment of FFR risk. Although regulators have focused on FFR and the fraud 
literature suggested that board governance characteristics have improved as a result, AC 
members still rely to an extent on the integrity of CEOs and CFOs (Beasley et al., 2009). 
However, CEOs and CFOs are the most likely perpetrators of FFR. Further, AC members 
are often identified for board service because of existing relationships with the CEO, 
CFO, or other board members (Beasley et al., 2009; Clune et al., 2013). As such, AC 
members may rely on individuals who are most likely to perpetrate FFR and may feel 
obligated to those individuals because of mutual relationship ties or a sense of obligation 
for their appointment to the board. As Ramamoorti (2008, p. 529) notes, “board culture is 
an important component of board failure...but it is easy to fault boards of directors for 
weak oversight, but we should also recognize that many of them may owe their position 
on the board to the CEO”.  
 AC members’ abilities to assess FFR risk are also potentially associated with 
management influence over other corporate governance actors upon whom the AC relies 
(e.g., external and internal audit). For example, Cohen et al. (2011), in an experimental 
study, documented that external auditors were less likely to insist on proposed audit 
adjustments if they perceived that CEO influence over the AC was high and management 
had a high level of incentive to manage earnings. And, external auditors’ strategies for 
negotiating audit adjustments were based, in part, on their perceptions of management-
AC connectedness (Cohen et al., 2011).  
 Further, reporting issues can influence internal auditors. The effectiveness of the 





al. (2009) documented that internal audit may report to both management and the AC and 
that “these reporting channels often lack substantial clarity” (Beasley et al., 2009, p. 102). 
The authors also noted that “in some firms, internal audit departments technically 
reported to the AC, but in reality, reported to the CEO” (p. 101). Further, CEO or CFO 
control over the internal audit function’s budget or providing input into the internal audit 
plan can potentially impair independence (Christopher, Sarens & Leung, 2009). As such, 
Boyle (2012) emphasized the need for strong internal audit-AC relationships, finding that 
internal audit fraud risk and control risk assessments are likely to be higher if internal 
audit reports directly to the AC chair. Thus, the AC’s ability to use the internal audit 
function as an ally depends not only on the AC’s ability to assess FFR risk, but its 
relationship to the internal audit function as well.  
 Clearly, the ability of the AC to carry out its duties is associated with not only 
AC-management relationship ties, but also by complex interactions between the AC and 
other corporate governance actors. How these relationships are associated with the AC’s 
oversight of FFR risk is at the core of this study. To provide additional insight into this 
issue, I next examine the extant literature that has focused on AC processes and then 
examine studies of management-director relationship ties. 
The Audit Committee and the FFR Oversight Process 
 Many corporate governance studies in accounting and auditing have focused on 
governance variables associated with the AC oversight, including “AC composition, 
independence, knowledge and expertise, effectiveness, power, duties, and 
responsibilities; and earnings manipulation and fraud” (see Cohen et al., 2004, p. 91), or 





effectiveness or investor perceptions of these dimensions” (Bédard & Gendron, 2010, 
p.176). However, Cohen et al. (2004) noted that:  
The issue of how management interacts with the other players in the 
corporate governance mosaic to potentially affect financial reporting 
quality is ripe for further exploration. To date, there has been almost no 
research that has directly looked at how management affects the corporate 
governance mosaic. (p. 142)  
 
As such, I examine more recent qualitative or “black box” studies of ACs (Beasley et al., 
2009; Gendron & Bédard, 2006; Gendron et al., 2004) that offer insight into how ACs 
operate and handle their responsibilities, including their oversight of FFR risk and how 
other actors in the corporate governance mosaic influence the AC’s judgments.  
 The more recent “black box” studies of ACs portray the AC as being more 
actively engaged in carrying out its responsibilities (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron et 
al., 2004; Gendron & Bédard, 2006), but there is some evidence that ACs still serve in 
ceremonial roles (Beasley et al., 2009). Gendron et al. (2004) interviewed AC members 
in three Canadian public corporations, finding that AC members placed a great deal of 
emphasis on the accuracy of financial statements and the quality of the work of the 
external auditors, but relied heavily on both internal and external auditors. AC members 
gained “comfort” with management assertions and the quality of financial statements and 
the work of the auditors by asking probing questions. The goal of this process was to 
assess the trustworthiness of management and auditors through the degree of consistency 
of their responses. These findings were consistent with the agency theory perspective of 
corporate governance that portrays directors as independent monitors of management. 
However, Gendron et al. (2004) did not specifically address the issue of the AC’s 





 In a subsequent study, Gendron and Bédard (2006, p. 211) examined AC meeting 
attendees’ perceptions of AC effectiveness in three Canadian public corporations. One of 
the primary findings of this study was that AC members’ perceptions of the AC’s abilities 
to carry out its duties ranged from “confidence to hopefulness to anxiety”. A more 
problematic finding was that AC members were less confident about auditors’ and AC 
members’ abilities to detect fraud. AC members were characterized as being “hopeful” 
that their actions would reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud and that by focusing on 
whistle blowing channels and the AC’s assessment of management integrity, they could 
“hopefully” manage this task. Other findings in this study suggested that AC members 
looked into member backgrounds, features of AC meetings, and informal activities 
outside of AC meetings to develop their sense of AC effectiveness. Further, AC members 
relied, to a great extent, on internal and external auditors to carry out their duties.  
 Collectively, several general themes emerged from these two studies: 1) AC 
members appeared to strive to carry out their responsibilities; 2) AC members relied upon 
external actors in corporate governance, as well as their own efforts, to assess FFR risk; 
 3) AC members recognized the importance of maintaining communication channels to 
parties outside of the corporate mosaic including whistleblowers; and 4) AC members 
were not comfortable with assessing FFR risk. Still, AC members agreed to board service 
although they were “hopeful” at best that they could assess FFR risk, yet they potentially 
risked legal, regulatory, and reputational risks if FFR were to occur. Why then do AC 
members agree to board service given these risks? The qualitative study of Beasley et al. 





members in U.S. firms were equally as uncomfortable with assessing FFR risk as their 
counterparts in Canadian firms.  
 Beasley et al. (2009) interviewed 42 AC members from U.S. public company 
audit committees, and documented various AC processes. Comparable to the studies of 
Gendron et al. (2004) and Gendron and Bédard (2006), Beasley et al. (2009) also found 
evidence that AC members of U.S. public companies relied on their own actions, as well 
as the actions of external and internal auditors to assess FFR risk, but some AC members 
perceived that external and internal auditors were primarily responsible for fraud 
prevention and detection. Further, AC members did not place as great an emphasis on 
maintaining the whistleblower hotline as the AC members in the studies of Gendron et al. 
(2004) and Gendron and Bédard (2006). However, AC members in the U.S. did rely 
heavily on internal and external auditors, as well as management, to better understand 
key financial reporting risks. Beasley et al. (2009) also found that many AC members 
were uncomfortable with their responsibility for assessing FFR risk and lacked consensus 
as how to carry out this task. In many instances, AC members stated that they did not 
want to be responsible for assessing FFR risk or simply did not have the wherewithal to 
find fraud.  
These findings are odd given that many of the directors in the study were selected 
for board service because they were more likely to have professional experience in 
finance or accounting as a CFO, or possessed public accounting experience, or 
experience in general management (Beasley et al., 2009). Although the appointment of 
AC members to the board because of their accounting or financial expertise reflected an 





audit chairs were reluctant to say that their AC relied partly on its own actions to assess 
FFR risk may reflect an institutional perspective (Scott, 1987). This finding suggested 
that some ACs “are more symbolic (meeting regulatory requirements) rather than 
substance (a tool to effect organizational change or provide substantive oversight of 
management)” (Cohen et al., 2008b, p.186).  
 Beasley et al. (2009, p. 81) also found that AC members were often “identified for 
board service because of personal ties to management or board members or significant 
previous contact with executive management before being approached to serve on the 
board”. However, prospective AC members tended to be cautious and generally 
performed significant due diligence before accepting a board/AC position, including 
reading and reviewing SEC filings (including financial statements); meeting with or 
talking to existing board members, the CEO, CFO, and the external auditor; and talking 
to colleagues. AC members also assessed the reputation of the company and management 
before agreeing to board service. In many respects, AC members approached board 
service similar to how nominating committees approach the director nomination process 
by focusing on chemistry and comfort (Clune et al., 2013).  
 After agreeing to board service, AC members stated that they maintained comfort 
by continuously evaluating management integrity and evaluating whether they perceived 
that they were contributing to the board (Beasley et al., 2009). Participants in the study 
also stated that they were more likely to decline board service or to leave their position on 
the board or AC if they had concerns about management credibility and/or integrity or 
have witnessed fraud, illegal acts, or unethical behavior (Beasley et al., 2009). What is 





associated with their perceptions of “comfort” with the quality of board governance and 
management integrity. As such, I look to the academic literature examining board-
management connectedness and financial reporting quality to provide insight into the 
association between relationship ties and the quality of corporate governance.  
Personal and Professional Ties 
 Studies examining director-management personal and professional ties and other 
board characteristics have been much more common in the management field (see 
comprehensive literature review by Johnson Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013) than in the 
accounting/auditing field. The extant research on relationship ties in the 
accounting/auditing field has largely been archival and has produced contradictory 
findings (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 
2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; and Krishnan et al., 2011). Further, 
there is a dearth of studies examining the association between relationship ties and AC 
judgments.  
The studies of board ties initially focused on the association between “social” or 
“personal” ties between the board and management and financial reporting outcomes 
(e.g., earnings management, executive compensation, firm performance), but little 
attention was paid to AC-management ties. However, more recent studies have begun to 
focus on AC-management ties (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a; 
Hwang & Kim 2012) and have examined the association between personal and 
professional ties and corporate governance outputs (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; 
Chidambaran et al., 2012) and investors’ judgments (Cohen et al., 2012a). Still, I have 





associated with AC interactions with management and other corporate governance actors 
to assess FFR risk. To provide a more expansive view of relationship ties, I first examine 
the overall conceptual nature of relationship ties and the concepts of “independent” and 
“collaborative” boards. Then, I discuss the progression of relevant research findings in 
the accounting/auditing literature. 
 In the management literature, relationship ties have been linked to maintaining 
social capital. Johnson et al. (2013, p. 244) concluded that “Social capital in the form of 
personal or loyalty relationships has been argued to affect the incentives of directors 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; Westphal, 1999) and group dynamics (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) 
and may compromise director independence, but also may facilitate more open 
communications”. These relationships may include “a business tie (e.g., a buyer or 
supplier, consultant, or lawyer), often called “affiliated directors” or more broad 
“personal” relationships such as “being friends or family members of the CEO”” 
(Johnson et al., 2013, p. 244). How these relationship ties are associated with directors’ 
abilities to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities underlies the tension between the 
independent and collaborative board models.  
 The concept of the independent board is based on agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) that focuses on the board of directors’ efforts to minimize agency costs 
associated with the delegation of decision controls to management. From this perspective, 
“outside directors are considered to be less likely to collude with management” (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983, p. 315). Under agency theory, the primary attributes for a board member 
are independence from management and expertise in monitoring and control. Although 





independence as a means of enhancing corporate governance quality, several studies of 
relationship ties found that directors may be formally independent yet compromised by 
social ties (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 
2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012). 
Westphal (1999, p. 8) explained this phenomenon, suggesting that CEOs use 
social and psychological factors that “compromise the willingness and ability of directors 
to monitor management through the appointment of board members who are personal 
friends or whom they share close social ties” (also see Finklestein & Hambrick, 2006; 
Johnson et al., 1993; Kimberly & Zajac, 1988). As such, AC members may seek to 
follow “communal norms” established by the board as a whole because “board 
appointments confer prestige and status as well as financial rewards and perquisites” 
(Westphal, 1999, p. 8). Directors may also feel “socially obligated to support CEOs that 
favored their appointment” (Westphal, 1999, p. 10). CEO appointment of friends to the 
board is consistent with the managerial hegemony perspective (e.g., Kosnik, 1987), as 
well as institutional theory (Scott, 1987). Overall, the “independent board model” 
suggests that boards may strive to provide effective oversight but management-director 
social ties can potentially impair directors’ ability to monitor and control management 
decision-making and performance (Westphal, 1999).  
 On the other hand, the “collaborative board” model suggests that directors are 
capable of both providing advice and counsel and exercising oversight and control 
(Westphal, 1999). Adams and Ferreira (2007) suggested that management may attempt to 
strike a balance between controlling the board and receiving beneficial advice from board 





directors can improve a director’s ability and effectiveness in governing the company. 
Likewise, Westphal (1999, p. 7) concluded that “a lack of social independence can 
increase board involvement and firm performance”. Further, Westphal (1998, 1999) 
found that directors without social ties to the CEO are not necessarily more likely to 
scrutinize management by challenging top managers on strategic issues. Collectively, 
these findings suggested that there is a benefit to appointing board members despite the 
presence of relationship ties because directors feel accountable to external parties and a 
desire to protect their status (Jensen, 2006).    
 Previous studies of relationship ties have primarily been survey-based (Uzzi, 
1996, 1997, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Ingram & Roberts, 2000; McDonald & Westphal, 
2003; and Westphal, Boivie, & Chng, 2006) or archival (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; 
Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; 
and Krishnan et al., 2011), although a recent study by Cohen et al. (2012a) is 
experimental. The survey-based studies dealt with “social embeddedness” issues, 
whereas the archival and experimental studies operationalized the concept of 
“homophily”. Embeddedness is defined as “the process by which social relationships 
shape economic action in ways that some mainstream economic schemes overlook or 
misspecify when they assume that social ties affect economic behavior only minimally 
or, in some stringent accounts, reduce the efficiency of the price system” (Uzzi, 1996, p. 
674). Embeddedness studies focused on establishing if explicit social relationships 
existed between individuals or actors. Researchers using the survey method asked 
participants to assess whether they have a relationship with other actors and the nature of 





“contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people” 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001, p. 416), which facilitates mutual 
understanding and comfort (Hwang & Kim, 2009). Researchers who operationalized 
relationship ties through homophily used archival data and various index measures to 
quantify mutual qualities and experiences such as a mutual alma mater, military service, 
regional origin, industry, etc. 
 The archival approach did offer the advantage of capturing broadly observable 
measures of relationship ties and can arguably capture unconscious ties that may not be 
captured by the survey approach. However, the archival approach cannot capture 
directors’ perceptions of their relationships and board duties. As such, the survey 
approach is necessary for the present study and offers the advantage of directly 
measuring the perceived strength of social ties (Westphal & Khanna, 2003).  
The findings in the extant accounting/auditing literature examining the association 
between relationship ties and accounting outcomes reflected the tension between the 
independent board and collaborative board perspectives. Consistent with institutional 
theory, Hwang and Kim (2009) found that social ties between board members and 
management were linked to higher levels of compensation, weaker pay-performance 
sensitivity, and weaker turnover sensitivity. In a subsequent study, the authors also found 
that social ties between the CEO and members of the AC were associated with higher 
levels of earnings management, suggesting that social ties impaired the AC’s execution 
of its oversight responsibilities (Hwang & Kim, 2012). Likewise, Dey and Liu (2011) 
documented that social ties and professional similarities, measured by whether a director 





reports and operating performance. Further, Fracassi and Tate (2011) found an 
association between CEO-director ties and reduced firm value and value destroying 
acquisitions.  
Hoitash (2011) also found that social ties between management and independent 
board directors were corrosive and were associated with higher management 
compensation, but this relationship was primarily driven by compensation committee 
members. On the other hand, Hoitash (2011, p. 399) found that “financial reporting 
quality was improved only when social ties included members of the AC”, suggesting the 
AC was either more capable of monitoring and providing advice to management or that 
social ties between management and the AC fostered more frequent and quality advice 
giving consistent with the “collaborative board” model.  
The apparent contradictions in the findings in the Hoitash study are perhaps best 
explained by Krishnan et al. (2011), who examined CEO/CFO-board ties and earnings 
management in the pre- and post-SOX eras. Although the authors found that CEOs/CFOs 
picked more socially connected directors in the post-SOX era, the corrosive effects of 
social ties were negated because of greater management/board risk aversion in the post-
SOX era. Subsequent studies supported this point of view and contradicted the findings 
of Hwang and Kim (2009, 2012) and Dey and Liu (2011), finding that directors with 
professional ties are more risk averse than those with personal ties.  
For example, Chidambaran et al. (2012, p. 12) found that CEO-board professional 
connections formed due to common prior employment decreased the probability of fraud, 
while non-professional ties “due to shared educational and non-business antecedents” 





(2012, p. 3) found that companies whose ACs have “friendship” (e.g., personal) ties to 
the CEO “purchased less audit services and engaged more in earnings management but 
directors with social ties formed through advice networks (e.g., professional ties) did not 
hamper the quality of AC oversight”. An experimental study by Cohen et al. (2012a) also 
indicated that investors perceived that AC members with professional ties to the CEO 
were more effective than those with personal ties, but investors perceived that AC 
members with no personal or professional ties to management were even more effective. 
As such, Cohen et al. (2012a, p. 23) suggested “the SEC may wish to consider building 
upon current disclosures and have companies state whether there are social connections 
or no connections between management and AC members”.  
Collectively, the academic literature suggests that the association between 
personal and professional ties and how AC members carry out their duties may depend 
upon a combination of factors. The independent and collaborative board models suggest 
that director-management relationship ties can affect financial reporting quality 
differently. As such, I develop competing hypotheses in the following section and expand 
on the previous academic research by including both personal and professional ties in my 









 In this study, I bring together the issue of relationship ties and AC oversight of 
FFR risk to examine the association between AC relationship ties and the process of 
overseeing FFR risk. This is the first study of corporate governance relationship ties to 
examine AC relationship ties and the full network of corporate governance actors using a 
monitor-agent and monitor-monitor perspective to examine how networks of AC 
participants and relationship ties are associated with AC fraud oversight judgments. This 
approach recognizes that AC members’ relationship ties to management, as well as to 
other corporate governance actors, can impact whether AC members employ an 
individual focus by relying on either the CEO or CFO or instead employ a “team focus” 
and rely on other corporate governance actors, or instead depend on their own efforts, to 
deal with FFR risks.  
Cohen et al. (2004) best summarize this perspective: 
For the audit to play an important role in the financial reporting process, 
the audit committee must be vested by the greater board with real power 
and sufficient expertise to serve as an effective monitor over 
management’s actions. 
 
The audit committee should be viewed as an ally to auditors in being 
steadfast in the goal of having a high quality financial reporting process 





As such, I propose two separate research questions to reflect the monitor-agent and 
monitor-monitor relationship ties. I then use the managerial hegemony perspective and 
institutional theory to develop hypotheses that reflect largely ceremonial AC oversight. I 
then use agency theory to reflect more substantive monitoring consistent with the 
independent board and collaborative board perspectives. I also use accountability theory 
to suggest how AC members’ perceptions of their relationship ties to other corporate 
governance actors (monitor-monitor relationships) can lead to potentially conflicting 
strategies for assessing FFR risk. My research questions as formally stated are: 
RQ 1: Are audit committee members’ perceptions of their personal and 
professional ties to the CEO and CFO associated with AC members’ 
reliance on CEOs and CFOs and other corporate governance actors (e.g., 
other AC members, other independent directors, the head of internal audit, 
and the external audit partner in charge of the company’s audit) to assess 
FFR risk and how the AC relies on its own efforts to assess FFR risk and 
management’s integrity? 
 
RQ 2: Are audit committee members’ perceptions of their personal and 
professional ties to the other corporate governance actors (e.g., other AC 
members, other independent directors, the head of internal audit, and the 
external audit partner in charge of the company’s audit) associated with 
AC members’ reliance on CEOs and CFOs and other corporate 
governance actors to assess FFR risk and how the AC relies on its own 
efforts to assess FFR risk and management’s integrity? 
 
 In the following section, I develop the hypotheses. In the subsequent figures, 
(Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4), I focus on describing the dependent variables and the 

























Figure 1.4 Conceptual Research Model: DV 2 
 
Monitor-Agent Relationship Hypotheses 
 In this section, I examine the expected effects of relationship ties between the AC 
members and management. I first develop the hypotheses related to personal ties. I then 
focus on professional ties. Overall, I expect the effects of personal ties to be more 
pronounced than those of professional ties. 
Personal Ties  
 The vast majority of studies of personal relationship ties have supported the 
managerial hegemony and institutional theory perspectives. In the AC setting, the 
managerial hegemony perspective suggests that director independence may be 
compromised by social influences and CEO influence over the selection of board 





with whom they share social ties” (Westphal, 1999, p. 8) and that board committees 
merely exist to fulfill regulatory requirements (Kosnik, 1987). Institutional theory posits 
that ACs serve in largely ceremonial roles but do not necessarily provide vigilant 
monitoring (Cohen et al., 2008b). As such, these theories suggest that management is 
concerned with giving the appearance of effective monitoring, although the reality of the 
situation may be that management is capable of influencing AC members either directly 
or through networks of relationships among AC participants that Spira (1999, p. 256) 
noted “in practice subvert regulatory intentions”.  
 Under the managerial hegemony and institutional theory perspectives, I would 
expect that management and the board would emphasize directors’ personal ties to 
management and the need for directors to follow the boards’ communal norms (Segal, 
1979) or to reciprocate benefits in exchange for the benefits and status associated with 
appointment to the board (e.g., Mills & Clark, 1982; Jehn & Shah, 1997). Further, I 
would expect the CEO to have significant influence over the director nomination process 
(e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Clune et al., 2013; Fracassi & Tate, 2011).  
 There is a great deal of support for the managerial hegemony/institutional theory 
perspective in the management and auditing/accounting literature that has found that 
management may seek to appoint members of the board who are personal friends or with 
whom they share close social ties (Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2011; Hwang & 
Kim, 2009, 2012). This may be done to impress external constituents (Westphal & 
Graebner, 2010) and to create a more management friendly board that is under the control 
of management (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012). These findings are supported by studies 





AC members and management has, with certain exceptions (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 
2012), been associated with poorer corporate governance (e.g., Bruyneseels & 
Cardinaels, 2011; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2011; 
Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012) or less favorable investor perceptions of AC effectiveness 
(Cohen et al., 2012a).  
 The findings in the research examining AC processes (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; 
Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron & Bédard, 2006) did not specifically address the issue of 
personal relationships and AC fraud risk assessments, but did document that ACs appear 
to seek to be vigilant monitors, either “hopeful” at best that they can assess fraud risks 
(Gendron & Bédard, 2006) or lacking consensus as to how to handle this responsibility 
(Beasley et al., 2009). Although each study found that AC members enlisted the aid of 
internal and external auditors to help them to carry out their responsibilities, there is some 
evidence that AC members relied on management (Beasley et al., 2009). However, 
Beasley et al. (2009) does offer insight into the steps taken by AC members before 
agreeing to board service that potentially provides explanations as to why directors with 
friendship ties to management may be more predisposed to rely more heavily on 
management than other corporate governance actors. 
 Beasley et al. (2009) documented that AC members were often identified for 
board service because of their previous contact with management and other board 
members; however, they performed significant due diligence before agreeing to board 
service include assessing management’s integrity and taking other steps to gain comfort. 
Likewise, Clune et al. (2013) documented that management and directors placed a great 





there is a large degree of mutual comfort and chemistry that can lead to trust (Stevenson 
& Radin, 2009). Indeed, Stevenson and Radin (2009) documented that prior ties are a 
strong indicator of current ties.  
 The degree of trust between AC members and management can also be associated 
with the strength of directors’ ties to the CEO. CEOs can be very powerful. Research has 
found that CEOs still influence the board nomination process, although the level of 
influence may vary widely by company (Clune et al., 2013). In addition, Stevenson and 
Radin (2009) documented that CEO power trumps the influence of being an independent 
director when the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Directors with friendship ties to 
the CEO may also feel an allegiance to management (Cohen et al. 2012a; Fredrickson, 
Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988), and research has documented that friendship ties are more 
likely to encourage closer bonding than professional ties (Cohen et al., 2012) which can 
lead to reciprocity (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012). Hoitash (2011, p. 404) also noted 
that board members often do not have time to gain sufficient knowledge of a company 
and thus, “depend on information received from management”. In addition, Bruynseels 
and Cardinaels (2012) found that companies with ACs that have “friendship ties” to the 
CEO are less likely to purchase audit services suggesting less reliance on other corporate 
governance monitors.  
Collectively, these findings lead me to expect that AC members with personal ties 
to management are not only more comfortable with relying on management to assess 
FFR risk, but also are less likely to rely on other corporate governance actors or their own 
efforts to assess FFR risk and that the strength of the relationships will be strong because 





association is likely to be strong because friendship ties are characterized as being 
governed by “communal norms” (Westphal, 1999) and directors “that do not maintain 
social relationships outside of board meetings can be perceived as behaving irrationally if 
they bring up controversial issues” (Stevenson & Radin, 2009, p. 34). Consistent with the 
managerial hegemony perspective and institutional theory, I expect that AC members 
with greater personal ties to the CEO/CFO will rely more strongly on the CEO/CFO to 
assess FFR risk and will rely significantly less on other corporate governance actors and 
the AC’s own efforts to assess FFR risk. The hypotheses stated formally in alternative, 
rather than in null form, are:    
H1a: There is a positive association between AC members’ perceptions of 
their personal ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on the 
CEO/CFO to assess FFR risk. 
 
H2a: There is a negative association between AC members’ perceptions of 
their personal ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on other 
corporate governance actors to assess FFR risk. 
 
H3a: There is a negative association between AC members’ perceptions of 
their personal ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on their 
own efforts to assess FFR risk and management’s integrity. 
 
Professional Ties 
More recent academic studies of relationship ties have begun to differentiate 
between personal and professional ties. The basic argument put forth in these studies is 
that directors with professional ties bring enhanced industry and business knowledge of 
business risks and accounting issues (Cohen et al., 2012a), enhance the development of 
business relationships that can lead to trust and confidence and a good working rapport 
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Hoitash, 2011), and promote work-related information 





the other hand, professional ties are less likely to create close friendships (Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels, 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a) than social ties, and more controversial 
information is less likely to flow through professional networks (Gibbons, 2004). This 
suggests that those with professional ties are less likely to be influenced by management 
than those with personal ties that may have been developed over long periods of time 
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012). Further, it suggests that professional and social ties 
operate through different channels and lead to different types of monitoring and advising 
(Chidambaran et al., 2012). These differences are reflected in and supported by recent 
findings in the auditing/accounting academic literature. 
The findings in the studies of relationship ties that have differentiated between 
personal and professional ties have also found that professional ties between directors 
and management are associated with good corporate governance outcomes. For example, 
two archival studies found that social ties formed through advice networks do not appear 
to hamper the quality of AC oversight (Bruyneseels & Cardinaels, 2011) and that 
professional connections formed due to common prior employment decreased fraud 
probability when individuals share service as executives (Chidambaran et al., 2012). In 
an experimental study, Cohen et al. (2012a) also found that investors perceive that ACs 
with professional ties are more effective than those with social ties, but not more 
effective than ACs with no ties. These findings are consistent with agency theory (e.g., 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) that hold that the board is an 
independent monitor of management.  
Two additional studies also reflected the agency perspective, but do not attribute 





hand, Hoitash (2011) found that management-director social ties could enhance financial 
reporting, but only if social ties included members of the AC. This finding suggested that 
social ties facilitated information sharing between management and AC members and 
that relationship ties were “important only for board members having direct responsibility 
over a particular task” (Hoitash, 2011, p. 401). On the other hand, Kirshnan et al. (2011) 
found that CFO/CEO-board social ties were positively related to earnings management, 
but management/board risk aversion negated the corrosive effects of social ties in the 
post-SOX era and led to less earnings management.  
Collectively, these findings, as well as those of the studies that differentiated 
between personal and professional ties, suggest that director-AC interactions are complex 
and are associated with multiple factors including types of relationship ties, director 
responsibilities, and the regulatory environment. However, the studies appear to suggest 
that AC members with professional ties are more risk averse and thus, are more capable 
of both providing better corporate governance oversight and collaborating with 
management, as posited by Bruynseels & Cardinaels (2012), Chidambaran et al. (2012), 
and Cohen et al. (2012a). This perspective is consistent the “collaborative board” model.  
The “collaborative board” model suggests that social ties enhance advice giving 
and information sharing (e.g., Westphal, 1999; Adams & Ferreira, 2007). Westphal 
(1999, p. 9) noted that the literature on advice giving has found that individuals may be 
reluctant to seek advice because they may perceive that “asking for advice would reflect 
uncertainty or dependence or would disclose the existence of a problem or that the 
individual may not have the ability to solve the problem”. As such, advice seeking 





comfort and trust associated with management-director ties can influence managers to 
seek advice on strategic issues and enhance the propensity for outside directors to offer 
such advice (Westphal, 1999; Hoitash, 2011).  
 The findings of the studies of professional ties and AC outcomes consistently 
suggest that management-director professional ties lead to better corporate governance 
outcomes than management-director personal ties. This is consistent with findings that 
social ties are more likely to result in closer friendships than professional ties (Bruynseels 
& Cardinaels, 2012) and thus, management influence. However, professional 
relationships can breed friendship and trust and encourage board involvement and board 
effectiveness (Hoitash, 2011). Beasley et al. (2009) indirectly confirmed this finding that 
AC members identified for AC service had prior relationships with management and the 
board but generally sought to provide substantive monitoring. Consistent with agency 
theory, I hypothesize that AC members with professional ties to the CEO/CFO will still 
rely on management to some extent to assess FFR risk and will still rely less on other 
corporate governance actors as well as the AC’s own efforts to assess FFR risk because 
of the inherent comfort and trust derived from management-director professional 
relationships. However, the associations will be less strong than for personal ties above. 
Stated formally: 
H1b: Relative to AC members’ perceptions of their personal ties, there is a 
less positive association between AC members’ perceptions of their 
professional ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on the 
CEO/CFO to assess FFR risk. 
 
H2b: Relative to AC members’ perceptions of their personal ties, there is a 
less negative association between AC members’ perceptions of their 
professional ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on other 






H3b: Relative to AC members’ perceptions of their personal ties, there is a 
less negative association between AC members’ perceptions of their 
professional ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on their 
own efforts to assess FFR risk and management’s integrity. 
 
Monitor-Monitor Hypotheses 
Personal and Professional Ties 
 
 In this section, I do not differentiate between my hypotheses for personal and 
professional ties and AC reliance because similar arguments can be made for each tie. 
Further, researchers have not addressed how different relationship ties between AC 
members and other corporate governance actors (e.g., other AC members, other 
independent directors, the head of internal audit, and the external audit partner in charge 
of company’s audit) are associated with AC members’ fraud risk assessments. Thus, there 
are no comparative studies. As such, I primarily develop my hypotheses based on general 
guidelines for ACs (e.g., NYSE, 1999), studies of accountability (e.g., Jensen, 2006; 
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Messier & Quilliam, 1992; Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock, 1985a, 
1985b) and the judgment and decision making (JDM) literature (e.g., Arnold & Sutton, 
1997). 
 The “Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees” (NYSE, 1999, p. 37) recognized that AC practices vary “by industry, 
competitive environment, stage in the business cycle, and business risks” and as such, set 
forth “guiding principles” for best practices that could be applied regardless of firm 
differences. These principles focused on interactions between the AC and other actors 
responsible for financial reporting quality including management, internal audit, and 





actors. This sentiment is echoed in numerous other AC “best practice” guides as well. 
Collectively, the BRC’s (1999) recommendations stressed the need for the AC to 
understand each actor’s role and responsibilities and for the AC to use internal and 
external auditors “to verify management compliance with process and procedures and to 
seek additional input on any significant judgments made” (NYSE, 1999, p. 42).  
 Service on the AC is a difficult and demanding task that requires diligent and 
knowledgeable members who are dedicated and interested in the job and are willing to 
make large time commitments in addition to their other board responsibilities (NYSE, 
1999). The BRC’s “guiding principles” recommend that members have proper 
backgrounds and knowledge and that training and education programs be used to fill in 
“knowledge gaps” or “know-how” (NYSE, 1999, p. 44). The importance of experience 
and knowledge is also echoed in the academic literature. For example, Roberts, et al. 
(2005, p. S6), in a qualitative study of non-executive directors in the U.K., noted that 
“accountability is created through a wide range of behaviors including challenging, 
questioning, testing, probing, debating, advising, and informing- that are central to how 
non-executives come to be effective”. AC members who do not acquire an adequate 
understanding of the company on the boards on which they serve risk being perceived as 
less credible and providing less value to the firm (Roberts et al., 2005). This perspective 
is corroborated by Gendron et al. (2004), who found that AC members asked diligent 
questions to establish their perceived effectiveness and found that some AC members 
“probe and push” external auditors to “convince external auditors that the AC, and not 
the CEO, drives external auditing” (p. 166). Collectively, these findings suggest that AC 





hand, AC members may rely on other corporate actors to give a ceremonial appearance of 
effective oversight. On the other hand, AC members may rely on other corporate 
governance actors to enhance the quality of AC oversight and accountability between 
corporate governance actors, or to alleviate time constraints that otherwise might impair 
the AC members’ ability to provide adequate oversight, or to address directors’ 
“knowledge-gaps”.  
 Ultimately, AC members’ motivations for relying on other corporate governance 
actors are tied to their propensity to seek advice. As posited by the “collaborative board” 
model, relationship ties can facilitate mutual trust and collaboration between AC 
members and management. Likewise, the same concept applies to AC members’ 
relationships with other corporate governance actors, except that the structural nature of 
the relationship is closer to that of allies, although arguably external auditors and 
management have built up relationships over time and internal audit may ultimately be 
responsible to management (NYSE, 1999). The AC is responsible for “holding 
management accountable to the board and the board accountable to shareholders” 
(NYSE, 1999, p. 20), but is also responsible for holding internal and external auditors 
accountable as well. Thus, I posit that the extent to which AC members choose to rely on 
other corporate governance actors is, in part, a function of AC members’ efforts to be 
accountable as well as the degree to which they hold other corporate governance 
monitors accountable. How AC members use their relationship ties with other corporate 
governance monitors to facilitate accountability and to enhance FFR risk assessments is 





 Accountability “refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be 
called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, 
p. 255). Accountability “also usually implies that people who do not provide a 
satisfactory justification for their actions will suffer negative consequences” (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999, p. 255). Thus, individuals are expected to make better decisions if they 
perceive that they are being held accountable. There is also a social aspect of 
accountability, as Tetlock (1985a, p. 307) posits there are “critical rule and norm 
enforcement mechanisms associated with individual decision makers on one hand and the 
social systems to which they belong on the other”. Individuals who fail to provide proper 
accounts for their behavior risk censure depending upon the severity of their offense and 
organizational norms (Tetlock, 1985a). As such, this perspective recognizes that 
individual accountability to others influences actions, and individuals can take numerous 
strategies to justify their actions (see Messier & Quilliam, 1992).  
 FFR represents a predicament for AC members because it represents a potential or 
an actual negative situation that can affect the individual (Messier & Quilliam, 1992). 
When an individual is caught in a predicament, their actions may not meet the normative 
expectations of an evaluative audience and, therefore, the individual may be punished. 
For example, in companies experiencing financial restatements, the likelihood of board 
departure increases with the severity of the restatement and even more so for AC 
members (Srinivasan, 2005). As such, the severity of a predicament is associated with the 
undesirability of an event, the individual’s responsibility for the event, and the 





Accountability suggests that AC members may be motivated by different strategies by 
relying on other corporate actors to assess FFR risk. On one hand, AC members could 
rely less on others as a means of disassociating themselves from an incidence of fraud 
and minimizing personal responsibility (Messier & Quilliam, 1992). On the other hand, 
AC members may recognize the value of soliciting input from other corporate 
governance actors, as accountability “can lead to greater depth of processing and 
consistency in judgment policy and increase consensus” (Messier & Quilliam, 1992, p. 
133).       
 Whether AC members are more motivated by strategies to protect their status or 
instead are motivated by a commitment to substantive monitoring likely varies by 
individual. What is clear is that accountability is important for AC members and that AC 
members can either rely on their own efforts and/or the efforts of other corporate 
governance actors to assess FFR risk (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron & Bédard, 
2006; Gendron et al., 2004) as a means of maintaining both their accountability and 
reputation status, consistent with advice seeking behavior as posited by Westphal (1999) 
and Jensen (2006). The issue is, how does AC reliance improve accountability, and what 
motivates AC members to act on their own or to enlist the aid of others? Given the dearth 
of research linking relationship ties to AC members’ reliance, I look to the JDM literature 
to explain two different strategies that are the basis of my hypotheses. 
 In the JDM literature, consensus is “one of the most widely used surrogate 
performance measures in accounting and auditing” (Arnold & Sutton, 1997, p. 99). 
Consensus is also known as inter-rater reliability and is based “on the assumption that 





view, the AC member may view that other corporate governance actors demonstrate 
stable judgment over time. Reliability is a key component of expert performance but “the 
level of reliability does not appear to be a valid measure of the level of expertise” (Arnold 
& Sutton, 1997, p. 101). Rather, reliability suggests that the AC members will rely more 
on those individuals whose judgments they trust. Further, the relationship ties can 
enhance the propensity to seek advice from those one trusts (e.g., Westphal, 1999).  
 The studies of AC processes (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron & Bédard, 2006; 
Gendron et al., 2004) documented that AC members rely on internal and external auditors 
to some extent. The comments of the AC members in these studies indicated both the 
need for input from others as well as motivations to delegate fraud oversight duties. 
However, the presence of relationship ties would suggest that there is an element of trust 
underlying these relationships that could encourage AC members to rely more heavily on 
other corporate governance monitors. Further, AC members might rely on other corporate 
governance actors as a means of developing a network to “strengthen the AC as a 
network itself” (Spira, 1999, p. 240), which would be consistent with Stevenson & 
Radin’s (2009, p. 16) finding that “developing a strong network of ties among those who 
meet outside of board meetings is a more important predictor of social influence than 
human capital or ties across boards”. AC members may also seek to develop networks as 
the board’s power to govern is posited to be associated with “strong consensus and shared 
purposes” (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989, p. 38). As such, I would anticipate that the strength 
of AC members’ relationship ties with other corporate governance actors would be 





which in turn, would lead AC members to rely less on the CEO/CFO and the AC 
members’ own efforts to assess FFR risk.  
 On the other hand, the JDM literature suggests another strategy. AC members 
may choose to rely more on their own efforts because of self-insight. Self-insight refers to 
“a decision maker’s understanding of his or her own decision-making process” (Arnold & 
Sutton, p. 101). Arnold and Sutton (1997, p. 101) state that there is no evidence that 
experts have a better understanding of their decision-making processes than non-experts. 
However, this perspective does not preclude the possibility that AC members will 
perceive that they are more capable of relying on their own efforts. Beasley et al.’s (2009, 
p. 98) findings that AC members relied “at least partly on their own efforts” to assess 
FFR risk provided some indirect, anecdotal evidence that AC members’ self-reliance may 
be tied to self-perceptions of expertise. As such, I posit that AC members may, via their 
relationship ties, perceive that the inter-rater reliability of certain other corporate 
governance actors is low, which in turn leads the AC member to be more self-reliant 
because the AC member perceives that his/her self-insight allows him/her to better assess 
FFR risk. As such, I would expect that these individuals would rely less on other 
corporate governance actors and more on the CEO/CFO and their own efforts to assess 
FFR risk.  
 Because there are competing arguments, I make no directional predictions about 
the relationship between AC members’ perceptions of their personal or professional ties 
to other corporate governance actors and AC members’ reliance on the CEO/CFO, or 
other corporate governance actors, or AC members’ reliance on their own efforts to 





H1c: There is no association between AC members’ perceptions of their 
personal or professional ties to other corporate governance actors and AC 
members’ reliance on the CEO/CFO to assess FFR risk. 
 
H2c: There is no association between AC members’ perceptions of their 
personal or professional ties to other corporate governance actors and AC 
members’ reliance on other corporate governance actors to assess FFR 
risk. 
 
H3c: There is no association between AC members’ perceptions of their 
personal or professional ties to other corporate governance actors and AC 





 As discussed later, I test H3a, H3b, and H3c two different ways. First, I use the reliance questions as the 
dependent variable (i.e., reliance on yourself and on other AC members). Second, I use measures of the 
AC’s actions to assess fraud risk and management integrity as dependent variables. These action measures 








The more recent archival studies of personal and professional ties obtain 
biographical and other personal information of directors to develop measures of 
relationship ties. Although this approach allows the researcher to differentiate between 
types of relationship ties, it assumes that the strength of relationship ties is associated 
with the number of common ties between individuals or groups, when in fact this may not 
be the case. For example, many individuals sharing the same alma mater do not actually 
know each other or may have been informal acquaintances, as opposed to developing 
deeper friendship bonds.  
Although Hwang and Kim (2009) asserted that perceptions of relationship ties 
include only the conscious tie (and excludes any potential subconscious tie), the survey 
approach I use provides a direct measure that may more accurately reflect the reality of 
the connection between two individuals. Further, I have to use a survey approach to 
capture AC members’ perceptions of their personal and professional ties and their 
strategies for assessing FFR risk, as these perceptions cannot be captured by archival 
data. I operationalize the conceptualized research model as indicated in Figure 1.5 below. 







 Figure 1.5 Conceptual Research Model Operationalized 
Research Instrument 
The survey instrument measures (a) the extent to which AC members rely on the 
CEO and CFO, other corporate governance actors, and the AC itself to assess FFR risk, 
(b) AC members’ perceptions of the responsibility of management, other corporate 
governance actors, and the AC itself for assessing FFR risk, (c) AC actions to assess FFR 
risk and management’s integrity, and (d) AC members’ perceptions of their personal and 
professional relationship ties to the CEO and CFO and other corporate governance actors.   
I also examine other pertinent corporate governance variables.  
The survey is based in part on Beasley et al.’s (2009) interview results, using 
scales similar to those found in Bierstaker, Cohen, DeZoort, & Hermanson (2012). I use 





personal and professional relationships and the degree to which AC members are self-
reliant or rely on others to assess FFR risk. I use 100-point numerical interval scales that 
are common in the accounting literature to attempt to precisely measure AC members’ 
perceptions. In developing the survey, I followed Hair et al.’s (2011) guidelines for scale 
development (pp. 209-246) and relied heavily upon content validation (p. 238) by 
submitting the survey for a series of reviews by researchers and others with accounting 
backgrounds that are knowledgeable about ACs and the subject matter of this study.
2
 The 
following sections describe the consideration given to the development of each construct. 
Independent Measures: Personal and Professional Ties 
 The independent variables are broken into two subsets to reflect personal and 
professional relationship ties between (a) monitors (e.g., AC members) and agents of 
corporate governance (e.g., CEO/CFO), and (b) monitors (e.g., AC members) and other 
monitors of corporate governance (e.g., other AC members, other independent directors, 
the head of internal audit, and the external audit partner in charge of the firm’s 
engagement). In the academic literature, measures of personal and professional ties differ 
across studies. Because the focus of this study is not to glean the relative strength of 
every individual relationship tie that is included in my definitions of personal and 
professional ties, but rather to accurately capture the strength of personal or professional 
ties between individuals, I take a more inclusive approach by including measures from 
multiple studies.  
 
2
 For the instrument’s 100-point graphic rating scales, participants were asked to indicate their responses 
by placing a slash on a ruled line with labeled anchors. Their slash-mark responses were then converted to 
the 0-100 scale based on where the slash crossed the line (Bierstaker et al., 2012). However, some 
respondents indicated their answers with a circle or a horizontal line. These responses were converted to a 






  Personal or “social ties” have been measured using a variety of index measures 
that have generally included the following “nonfamilial, informal connections” (Krishnan 
et al., 2011, p. 537): mutual alma mater, military service, regional origin, academic 
discipline and industry, and third party connections (Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; 
Krishnan et al., 2011); friendship ties formed through non-professional networks (e.g., 
sharing a past or present membership in the same charity, leisure club, or other non-
professional associations) (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012); mutual alma mater, overlap 
in military service, and shared past employment (Dey & Liu, 2011); past employment, 
education, and other activities between outside directors and the CFO/CEO (Krishnan et 
al., 2011); shared service between a manager and an independent director in the present 
or past on boards of at least one additional company (Hoitash, 2011); graduating from the 
same university and remaining in contact as friends in the years since graduation (Cohen 
et al., 2012a); and common service at not-for-profit institutions (Chidambaran et al., 
2012).  
 There is some overlap between measures of personal and professional ties in the 
academic literature, as some studies consider a CEO and a director with service as a C-
level executive in his primary employment as a personal tie rather than a professional tie 
(Dey & Liu, 2011). The rationale behind this classification is that directors who are 
themselves executives might identify and empathize with the CEO of the firm on whose 
board they serve (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). As such, there is some inconsistency across 
studies. However, I have developed definitions of personal and professional ties based on 
the general consensus of the literature taken as a whole to help survey respondents to 





define “personal ties” as being instances where AC members and other individuals have 
non-business affiliations or interactions. I operationalize “personal ties” by including 
several measures used in the aforementioned studies (e.g., mutual alma mater, 
membership in social clubs and other organizations, military service), but expand the 
measures to include additional ties (e.g., family friends, family relationships, neighbors) 
patterned after Clune et al.’s (2013) study of board nominating committees. I also include 
a catchall category to capture all other common personal ties.    
 I operationalize “professional ties” in much the same manner as I have done with 
“personal ties”, but I primarily pattern my measures after the more recent studies that 
have specifically differentiated between personal and professional ties (e.g., Bruynseels 
& Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a). Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels (2012) define professional or “advice network ties” as ties based on past or 
present employment or education ties. Chidambaran et al. (2012) more narrowly define 
professional ties as common employment antecedents, while Cohen et al. (2012a, p. 17) 
differentiated between industry specific and other professional ties defining industry 
specific ties as a “board member and a CEO sharing board responsibilities at two 
companies in the same industry” and other professional ties “if a board member and a 
CEO sat on the same boards but on two boards in different industries than the one within 
which the company is operating as the company in question”.  
In this study, I define “professional ties” as instances where the AC member and 
another individual have interacted in a business capacity in a meaningful way, separate 
from service on the focal company’s board and AC. I operationalize “professional ties” 





company’s board, past employment and shared responsibilities) but expand the measures 
to include mutual service on not-for-profit boards, working together at another company 
or organization in a board member-executive capacity, maintaining supplier-customer 
relationships or a service provider-client relationship (external auditor, outside counsel, 
consultant, etc.), and knowing each other well through professional organizations. To 
provide further clarity to survey respondents and to capture some of the nuances of the 
personal and professional relationship ties, I use branching questions asking respondents 
to first indicate if a relationship tie exists and if so, to please explain and rate their 
perception of the strength of the tie. The advantage of this format is twofold. First, it 
allows me to determine if a respondent has incorrectly identified a personal tie as a 
professional tie and vice versa, and second, it may capture relationship ties that I have not 
included in my definitions. 
Dependent Measures: Audit Committee Strategies for Assessing FFR Risk 
 I operationalize the AC’s strategies for assessing FFR risk by first measuring the 
AC members’ reliance on actors in the corporate governance mosaic: management (e.g., 
the CEO/CFO) and other corporate governance actors (e.g., other AC members, other 
independent directors not on the AC, the head of internal audit, and the external audit 
partner in charge of the firm’s engagement), and I also measure participants’ reliance 
upon themselves. Conceptually, these measures reflect two ends of a continuum with 
relying on others at one end and self-reliance on the other. Next, I measure the AC’s own 
actions to assess FFR risk and to assess and monitor management integrity, based on the 





In the first section focusing on AC members’ reliance on others, I ask respondents to rate 
their reliance on specific actors. To provide further insight into the issue of AC reliance, I 
also include additional questions asking participants to rate their perceptions of each 
actor’s responsibility for assessing FFR risk. I also pose open-ended questions asking 
respondents to describe the reason for their reliance on others and their reason for 
assigning responsibility to actors whom they perceive as having a high degree of 
responsibility for this task. Asking open-ended questions offers the advantage of placing 
no constraints on respondents (Hair et al. 2011, p. 255) and may provide insight into AC 
members’ motivations for relying upon others. In the second section, I describe specific 
actions that ACs might take to assess FFR risk and ask respondents to indicate the extent 
to which each action is applicable to their AC. Then, at the end of each section, I once 
again include an open-ended question that allows respondents to indicate any other means 
that they use to assess FFR risk or to assess and monitor management’s integrity.  
Development of Scales 
I have created a 100-point interval scale that I use throughout the survey 
instrument to measure the independent and dependent variables. The use of 100-point 
scales is common in the accounting literature and allows me to capture a continuous 
measure of the intensity of AC members’ judgments. Similar-type 100-point interval 
scales have also been used in experimental studies to measure AC judgments in 
accounting disagreements (Bierstaker et al., 2012; DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2008) 
and investors’ judgments of the association between CEO-AC personal and professional 





 The individual sections of my survey instrument dealing with how the AC 
assesses FFR risk are primarily based on Beasley et al.’s (2009) interview results. 
Beasley et al. (2009) divided the issue of assessing FFR risk into three categories: (1) AC 
involvement in assessing financial statement fraud risks, (2) the AC’s own actions in 
assessing FFR, and (3) how the AC assesses and monitors management’s integrity. The 
first category considers AC reliance upon others to assess FFR risk, while the other two 
categories reflect what the AC actually does to assess FFR risk. To measure AC reliance 
upon others to assess FFR risk, I include the parties identified in Beasley et al. (2009) and 
expand the choices to include other actors in the corporate governance mosaic (e.g., 
Cohen et al., 2004). I also ask participants to indicate their perceptions of each party’s 
responsibility for assessing FFR risk, as the concepts of reliance and responsibility are 
intertwined. To measure what the AC actually does to assess FFR risk, I took the results 
of Beasley et al. (2009) and created appropriate questions. For example, Beasley et al. 
(2009, p. 94) reported that “ACs evaluate management’s body language”. In the survey 
instrument, I ask the participant to indicate the extent to which the AC assesses and 
monitors management’s integrity and include a question that says “Assesses 
management’s body language?” followed by a 100-point scale with endpoints labeled “0 
– Not at All” and “100 – A Great Deal”.  
 To measure AC members’ perceptions of their personal and professional 
relationships, I expand on the format used to measure AC reliance and perceptions of 
responsibility to measure the strength of relationships consistent with previous survey 
studies of social embeddedness (e.g., Uzzi, 1996, 1997, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Ingram & 





this information by determining if a relationship tie exists, and if so, the nature of the tie 
and the participant’s perception of the strength of the tie. By offering participants the 
opportunity to briefly describe the nature of their relationship, I can document if 
participants incorrectly identify their ties. I can also determine if there are ties that are 
outside of my already broad definitions or ties that have not been considered in prior 
academic research.  
 The following summary describes the content and measures that I use in each 
section of the survey:  
In section I, part A, I measure AC members’ FFR risk reliance on management 
(e.g., CEO/CFO) and other corporate governance actors (e.g., other AC members, other 
independent directors, the head of internal audit, and the external audit partner in charge 
of the company’s engagement), as well as AC members’ self-reliance. For the scale, I use 
100-point scales with endpoints labeled “0 – No Reliance” and “100 – Total Reliance”. In 
section I, part B, I measure AC members’ perceptions of each parties’ responsibility for 
assessing FFR using the same 100-point scales, but I change the endpoint labels to “0 – 
No Responsibility” and “100 – Total Responsibility”. I also measure AC members’ 
perceptions of their own responsibility for assessing FFR risk.  
In sections II and III, I measure the AC’s own efforts to assess FFR risk and 
management’s integrity. In section II, I include a series of questions that describe actions 
that the AC of the company can take to assess FFR risk and ask participants to rate the 
extent to which the AC engages in these actions. I capture the extent to which ACs 
engage in these actions using 100-point scales with endpoints labeled “0 – Not at All” 





describe actions that the AC of the company can take to assess and monitor management 
integrity. To measure the extent to which the AC engages in these actions, I also use 100-
point scales with endpoints labeled “0 – Not at All” and “100 – A Great Deal”.  
In sections IV and V, I measure AC members’ perceptions of their professional 
and personal relationships with management (e.g., CEO/CFO) and other corporate 
governance actors (e.g., other AC members, other independent directors, the head of 
internal audit, and the external audit partner in charge of the company’s engagement). For 
each relationship tie, I ask a Yes/No question to establish if a relationship tie exists, and if 
so, I provide a discussion box where participants can briefly describe the nature of the 
relationship. If a relationship tie does exist, I then ask the participant to indicate the 
strength of the tie. To measure the relationship strength, I use 100-point scales with 
endpoints labeled “0 – Very Weak” and “100 – Very Strong”.  
Other Measures 
 In section VI of the survey instrument, I ask demographic, AC, and governance 
questions. In section A, I capture demographic control variables that are common in the 
auditing/accounting literature, including gender, age, employment status, job title (if 
applicable), professional certifications, professional experience, and education. In section 
B, I capture company characteristics that are also common in the auditing/accounting 
literature, including the company’s size based on revenue, the company’s industry group, 
the company’s accounting firm, whether the company’s internal audit function is 
primarily “in-house” or outsourced, and to whom the internal audit function reports.   
 In section C, I ask a series of questions regarding the AC members' service. First, 





methodology to establish if AC members are accounting financial experts (AFE), 
supervisory financial experts (SFE), industry experts, industry and accounting experts, or 
industry and supervisory experts. Although financial expertise is generally associated 
with good corporate governance outcomes (Carcello et al., 2011b), research has found 
that accounting expertise specifically drives financial expertise (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 
2010; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008) and is associated with litigation risks (Krishnan & 
Lee, 2009). Further, Cohen et al. (2012b) found that AC members with industry expertise 
are more highly associated with financial reporting quality than AC members with 
financial expertise alone and that AC members with combinations of industry and 
accounting expertise curtail income-increasing discretionary accruals to a greater extent 
than AC members with accounting expertise alone. Further, AC members with industry 
and supervisory expertise reduce the likelihood of a financial restatement compared to 
AC members with supervisory expertise alone.  
 Second, I focus on director tenure by asking what year AC members joined the 
board. Directors with longer tenure “have been linked to cronyism with the CEO and, 
consequently, ineffective monitoring” (Sharma & Iselin, 2012, p. 150). On the other 
hand, Vafeas (2003) suggested that longer director tenure improves directors’ knowledge 
of a firm leading to better oversight. This perspective has been supported in the pre- and 
post-SOX literature. Beasley (1996, p. 443), in a pre-SOX study, found that “as outside 
director’s ownership in the firm and outside director tenure on the board increases, and as 
the number of outside directorships in other firms held by outside directors decreases, the 





study also found that director tenure in fraud firms was less than in no-fraud firms, and 
the difference was statistically significant.   
 In section D, I address AC composition and meeting process issues by asking 
participants to indicate AC size, number of financial experts on the AC, the tenure of the 
AC chair, and the frequency of AC meetings. AC size and meeting frequency have been 
widely studied in the prior literature; however, Bédard and Gendron (2010), in a 
comprehensive review of literature on ACs, found that AC size and the frequency of AC 
meetings are not frequently positively associated with AC effectiveness. On the other 
hand, these variables may potentially provide important insights into how AC members 
perceive their responsibilities for assessing FFR risk and how diligently they carry out 
their duties. There are two alternative views of AC size. On one hand, a larger AC may 
bring additional director expertise and knowledge to the board (Krishnan et al., 2011; 
Sharma & Iselin, 2012). On the other hand, larger boards and ACs may be more 
susceptible to managerial control (see Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) and have “free-riding” 
problems (Krishnan et al., 2011) whereby board and AC members may pass on their 
responsibilities to others. In the fraud literature, Beasley et al. (2010) found that the 
average AC size for fraud and no-fraud firms was about three members, but the number 
of ACs with at least three AC members was statistically higher for no-fraud companies 
(79%) than fraud companies (70%). Thus, members of very small ACs may arguably 
perceive their responsibilities differently than AC members on larger ACs because 
smaller ACs may have to rely on others because they lack needed experience and/or 





 AC meeting frequency is posited to be associated with the quality of financial 
reporting (Sharma & Iselin, 2012) and decreased likelihood of both fraudulent and non-
fraudulent financial misstatements (Abbott et al., 2000). However, Beasley et al. (2010) 
in their COSO sponsored study, found that the frequency of meetings was statistically 
higher for fraud firms than for no-fraud firms in the period of 2001-2004. Beasley et al. 
(2010) posited that fraud firms were more prone to experiencing financial distress which 
precipitated the need for additional meetings. Given the global meltdown of financial 
markets that began in late 2008 and the subsequent economic slowdown in the United 
States, AC members should arguably be formally meeting more often given a higher risk 
economic environment. By capturing AC meeting frequency, I potentially provide insight 
into how AC members are handling this relatively riskier economic environment. 
 In section E, I ask questions regarding AC members’ other AC experience 
including years of service, experience serving on ACs, and the number of ACs on which 
the AC members currently serve. By measuring the number of ACs on which an AC 
member currently serves, I provide insight into how AC members balance reputation and 
litigation risk of being spread too thin by sitting on multiple boards against the benefits of 
gaining additional expertise and knowledge by sitting on the additional boards (e.g., 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hunton & Rose, 2008). The findings of the academic literature 
suggest that the influence of multiple board memberships varies.  
 In a recent study of CEO-director relationship ties and fraud probability, 
Chidambaran et al. (2012, p. 4), found that directors with professional ties to CEOs, 
especially “those serving on multiple boards, reduced fraud probability consistent with 





Beasley et al. (2010), in their COSO sponsored study, found no statistically significant 
difference between the average number of director positions held by AC members in 
fraud firms and no-fraud firms. On the other hand, Sharma and Iselin (2012) in a study of 
AC multiple board memberships, tenure, and financial misstatements, found a significant 
positive association between financial misstatements and multiple-directorships in the 
post-SOX era. However, this relationship was negative for AC members with accounting 
expertise suggesting that AC members with accounting expertise are more aware of 
reputation and litigation risks. By capturing multiple board memberships and breaking 
out AC members’ expertise into multiple categories, I seek to provide additional insight 
into the AC expertise-multiple board membership relationship. I also ask if participants 
have ever experienced incidences of FFR while serving as a board or an AC member, as 
Fich and Shivdasani (2007, p. 308) found that the presence of sued directors “increases 
the probability of a fraud lawsuit”, suggesting that these directors have incurred 
reputational damage and have weaker reputations for monitoring. As such, this may be 
associated with how they carry out their responsibilities for assessing FFR risk.   
 In section F, I ask a series of questions regarding general governance 
characteristics. I capture director independence and board size information, which is 
common in the academic literature, but I also include measures of management power, 
including if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and if the CEO is also the founder 
of the company (e.g., Beasley, 1996). I also ask respondents to indicate CEO tenure. A 
higher percentage of AC members with board tenure less than that of the CEO tenure 





and CFOs are more likely to be associated with cases of alleged FFR (Beasley et al., 
1999, 2010). I also compare AC members’ board tenure against CFO tenure.  
 The issue of CEO power is important in the academic literature. The concern of 
researchers has been that CEO influence over the nomination of directors can 
compromise board independence and lead to less substantive oversight (e.g., Dey & Liu, 
2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Wade et al., 1990; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995). Further, CEO power has been found to compromise AC members’ 
expertise when CEO power is high (Lisic et al., 2012); result in more generous CEO 
contracts (Westphal, 1998); and influence external auditors’ proposed audit adjustments 
based on management incentive and external auditors’ perceptions of CEO influence over 
the AC (Cohen et al., 2011). Clune et al. (2013) also documented that CEOs still 
influence the director nomination process although the level of influence varies widely by 




Common Method Biases and Other Potential Biases 
 This study, like many other behavioral studies, is susceptible to common method 
biases because the data for the predictor and criterion variables are obtained from the 
same participants in the study. Common method biases can arise in situations where there 
is a common rater, a common measurement context, a common item context, or 
characteristics from the items themselves (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 
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 I explored the possible role of numerous governance and demographic variables in my analyses for Table 
6, Panels A-D. Based on these  analyses, I include board independence, AC size, and participant gender in 





2003). Two common methods for controlling for method bias are through the (a) design 
of the study’s procedures and/or (b) statistical controls (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
 I carefully designed the survey instrument and used methods recommended by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to help minimize the influence of many of the common method 
biases including carefully wording the questions and defining ambiguous terms such as 
“personal” and “professional” ties and “fraudulent financial reporting”; avoiding double-
barreled questions; protecting respondent anonymity; and assuring participants that there 
were no right or wrong answers. I also implemented remedies to address the issues of 
item context effects and respondent fatigue.  
 Item context effects “refer to any influence or interpretation that a subject might 
ascribe to an item solely because of its relation to the other items making up an 
instrument” (Wainer & Kiely, 1987). In this study, it is feasible that AC members may 
perceive an association between relationship ties and their own assessments of FFR risk 
leading to responses that reflect a social desirability bias. Social desirability “is generally 
viewed as the tendency on the part of individuals to present themselves in a favorable 
light, regardless of their true feelings about an issue or topic” (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 
881). Westphal (1999) documents that individuals may be reluctant to receive advice 
because of concerns about status; thus, AC members may understate their dependence on 
others because they possibly perceive such dependence as a sign of weakness and/or they 
desire to represent themselves as more capable of assessing the risk of FFR than they 
truly are. I cannot fully eliminate the possibility of these biases, but I attempted to 
minimize them, to an extent, by creating a separation between the predictor and criterion 





and the independent variables last, to minimize the possibility that respondents would 
imply causality between the two groups of variables. I also created psychological 
separation by placing AC group questions focusing on the AC’s own efforts to assess the 
risk of FFR at the end of the dependent variables’ sections. This remedy helped to create 
a separation between questions in the dependent and independent variable sections that 
focused on the AC members’ individual reliance on others to assess the risk of FFR and 
their individual relationships to other corporate governance actors. I assessed the 
effectiveness of these strategies through additional pretesting, consistent with Westphal 
(1998), finding no significant issues. 
 Respondent fatigue, which “refers to a respondent getting tired while responding 
due to the length or difficulty in completing the questionnaire” (Hair et al., 2011, p. 457), 
was also a concern in this study. The survey is lengthy, and as such, I risked a lower 
response rate due to respondent fatigue (Hair et al., 2011). To address this issue, I clearly 
communicated the purpose of the survey; the estimated time to complete the survey; and 
the importance of the survey, consistent with Wilkins (2012). Through additional pre-
testing, I assessed if there was a need to counterbalance the order of any of the questions 
(Podsakoff, et al., 2003) or a need to change the order in which the dependent variable 
measures of personal and professional ties were asked so as to ensure that neither set of 
measures was consistently the next to last section in the survey. This remedy could not 
fully compensate for possible order effects, but could allow me to maintain a 
psychological separation between measures of the dependent and independent variables. 
In pretesting, participants did not raise issues of respondent fatigue nor did they raise 





raise this issue and nearly all participants fully completed their surveys. The survey 
response rate (see below) was also very high suggesting respondent fatigue was not an 
issue.      
 In addition to the aforementioned steps, I also tested for non-response bias by 
including first mailing and second mailing respondents in my linear regression models 
(Table 6, Panels A-D) and found no significant differences (p > 0.35). I also compared 
the demographics of the participants to the total sample population obtained from the 
Audit Analytics database, consistent with the methodology of DeZoort & Salterio (2001). 
I found the percentage of male (87%) and female participants (13%) to be identical to 
that of the sample population. I found a higher percentage of CPAs among the 
participants (n = 48, 35.3%) than I found in the sample population (n = 125, 22%). This 
may have been attributable to an undercounting of CPAs in the sample population 
because of incorrect reporting of AC members’ CPA designations in the Audit Analytics 
database, exclusion of the CPA designation in proxy statement materials, and/or a higher 
rate of response because of the nature of the study.
4
 Finally, I used statistical methods to 
assess the common method biases. Specifically, I followed the methodology of Podsakoff 
et al. (2003) and used Harman’s single-factor test and confirmatory factor analysis (p. 
889). The results of Harman’s single-factor test did not indicate a problem resulting from 
common method bias. An exploratory factor analysis with the study’s variables revealed 
that no single factor accounted for more than 50% of the variance (AC reliance on 
CEO/CFO and other corporate governance actors = 31.82%, AC actions to assess fraud 
risk = 34.43%). I also assessed whether there was multicollinearity among the measures 
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 If CPA is added to the models in Table 6, Panels A – D, using two-tailed tests, it is marginally positive in 
two cases, insignificant in one case, and positive and significant (p = 0.048) in Panel D. The other results 





of the constructs finding that the determinant value for each correlation matrix was above 
the acceptable 0.001 threshold (e.g., AC reliance = 0.094, AC actions = 0.005, AC 
professional ties = 0.208). Further, the VIF scores on all the variables are 1.87 or below, 
indicating multicollinearity was not an issue.  
Construct Validity 
 Construct validity “is the extent to which a set of measured items actually reflects 
the theoretical latent construct those items are designed to measure” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 
686). All constructs must display adequate construct validity “whether they are new 
scales or scales taken from previous research and should be judged both qualitatively and 
empirically” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 674). The scales in this study were adapted from 
existing studies, but the constructs are somewhat unique, so they were tested for construct 
validity.  
 To assess construct validity, I followed the methodology of Hair et al. (2010) and 
performed confirmatory factor analysis. To enhance construct validity, I also conducted 
additional pre-testing following the methodology of Westphal (1998) and asked 
respondents to identify questions that are unclear, difficult to answer, or potentially 
subject to bias. I also asked for feedback from pre-test participants whether the questions 
were interpreted as expected to determine if improvements were needed for the format of 
the survey or if there was a need to modify the length of the survey.  
 Initially, I conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on each group of 
measures of the independent and dependent variables. The results indicated acceptable 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics for each group of measures above the acceptable 





being significant based on Bartlett’s test for sphericity. I found little evidence of cross 
loadings on any of the variables, and the total variances explained on the loaded factors 
exceeded the acceptable .60 threshold (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, I proceeded to create 
summated variables for the dependent and independent variables, by group, to better 
reflect the predicted hypotheses (e.g., management, AC, and other corporate governance 
actors). Additional EFA indicated that the lack of reported social ties between AC 
members and the head of internal audit and the external audit partner limited further 
analysis of the correlation between measures of the strength of each personal tie. Thus, I 
created dummy variables to measure the existence of relationship ties for both personal 
and professional ties (coded 1 = yes, 0 = no).  
 I then used Cronbach’s alpha to assess the reliability of all the summated 
variables and examined the correlations between/among the measures of the summated 
variables. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the dependent variables of AC actions to 
assess FFR risk (0.704) and AC actions to assess management’s integrity (0.729) were 
above the recommended level of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010), and the individual measures of 
each construct were highly correlated. Nearly all of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for 
the individual measures of the dependent variables of AC reliance on the CEO/CFO and 
AC reliance on other corporate governance actors were also above the 0.70 threshold, and 
the individual measures were highly correlated, with the exception of the summated 
measure for AC reliance on internal and external auditors (CA = 0.434). As such, I 
separated the individual measures for AC reliance on the internal and external auditors 
for analysis purposes. Among the summated measures of the independent variables, I 





exception of professional ties to other audit committee members and other independent 
directors (CA = 0.328), personal ties to the CEO and CFO (CA = 0.271), and personal 
ties to the other audit committee members and other independent directors (CA = 0.457). 
Thus, I separated the summated variables for each into individual measures for analysis 
purposes. 
Model 
 I used multivariate regression and MANOVA to examine the association between 
AC relationship ties and AC strategies for assessing FFR risk. Based on the discussion 
above, I used the following MANOVA model to test the hypotheses:
5
 
 (RELIANCE ON CEO/CFO, RELIANCE ON OTHER CORPORATE 
 GOVERNANCE ACTORS, RELIANCE ON AC’S OWN EFFORTS) = f 
 (MEASURES OF PERSONAL TIES, MEASURES OF PROFESSIONAL TIES, 
 and control variables)  
 
Based on the overall results, I used ANOVA and linear regression to conduct additional 
analysis.  
Pretesting 
 The original draft of the survey was pretested with a panel of four individuals, 
including two laypersons, a community college instructor, and an accounting expert. 
Based on their feedback, the content and organization of the survey were revised, and the 
survey’s readability, understandability and clarity were improved. The final version of 
the survey was submitted again for feedback to academic and accounting professionals 
who are knowledgeable about AC oversight duties. Their input helped to provide 
additional content validity.   
 
5
 For H3a, H3b, and H3c, this is the initial test of the hypotheses. Later, I focus on more specific measures 






One hundred thirty six (136) AC members from mid-sized U.S. public companies 
participated in the study. I used the Audit Analytics database to identify AC members 
with at least one year of AC service who were appointed or reappointed from 1/1/2008 to 
12/31/2011 to serve in companies with revenues greater than $0 but less than $2 billion. I 
eliminated 134 AC members with principal addresses in non-English speaking countries 
and 52 AC members who I could no longer verify served on the AC because either they 
recently resigned or another company acquired the company on whose board they served 
and the AC members’ position had been eliminated. Using Internet websites such as 
zabasearch.com, whitepages.com, reuters.com, and intellius.com, combined with the 
biographical information in the company’s shareholder proxy statement, I located the 
primary business or home address of the AC members (e.g., Wilkins, 2012). In those 
cases where I could not determine an AC members’ home or business address because (a) 
the AC member had recently moved and a new address was not yet available, (b) the AC 
had retired, or (c) there was a question as to the accuracy of the address, I sent the survey 
directly to the AC company. Following Dillman (2009), I included personalized request 
letters from the chair of my dissertation committee as well as my own personal request 
using colored letterhead and hand stamped return envelopes. See Appendix A and 
Appendix B for the personalized request letters and the complete survey instrument. 
 I mailed the survey to 542 AC members. Following Dillman (2009), I mailed the 
survey using the United States Postal Service (USPS) priority service with delivery 
confirmation. A second request using standard USPS mail service was sent 





returned for incomplete or inaccurate addresses. In these cases, I resent the survey to the 
address of the AC company. In total, I received 16 sets of undeliverable materials. As of 
August 17, 2013, I received a total of 136 AC member responses with a response rate of 
26% 
6
 based on the adjusted sample size of 526. The 26% response rate is higher than the 
expected 20% to 25% response rate for mailed AC surveys (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993). 
The response rate compares well to DeZoort and Salterio’s (2001) study of AC 
judgments, which reported a 20% response rate, as well more recent studies sponsored by 
large accounting firms (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2008) which reported response 
rates ranging from 15% to 28%. The response rate is also significantly higher than the 
response rates for other unsponsored studies (e.g., Bierstaker et al., 2012; Rupley et al., 
2011) which have reported response rates of 10% or less. The sample size of 136 AC 
members is above the minimum ratio of five observations to each independent variable 
(Hair et al. 2010, p. 175). Further, the demographic characteristics of the participants 




 Supplemental analysis revealed no evidence of early/late response differences in the models presented in 











 Table 1, Panel A (shown below) presents the demographic information for the 
136 participants. Most participants are male (86.8%) and retired (64.7%). Some 
participants are currently CEOs (13.2%); CFOs (6.6%); or chairman of a board (2.2%). 
Other participants reported some other position title (12.5%) or gave no response (0.8%). 
Many (35.3%) of the participants are also certified public accountants. Participants are 
more likely to have professional experience in general management (59.6%), or as CFOs 
(47.1%), or have professional experience in public accounting (36.8%). Other 
participants reported having other professional experience in finance or accounting  
(24.3%), or experience as a controller (20.6%), accounting professor (2.2%), or as a 
financial/accounting regulator (2.2%). Most participants are also well-educated (masters 
degree (47.1%), JD (8.1%), doctorate (4.4%), and/or some other type of advanced degree 
(3.7%)). In addition, a majority (58.8%) serve on ACs of companies with under $500 
million in annual revenues. Most (75.7%) companies of the participating AC members 
operate in non-regulated industries. These companies are primarily audited by Big 4 
accounting firms (66.9%) and possess in-house audit functions (55.9%). Internal audit 
 
7
 In cases where the participants did not respond to the survey question, or the questions were not 





TABLE 1. Participant Demographics (n = 136) 
 Panel A: Percentages Number Percent 
  
Gender 
 Male 118 86.8%  
 Female 18 13.2% 
 
Current Job Title 
 Retired 88 64.7% 
 CEO 18 13.2% 
 CFO 9 6.6% 
 Chairman 3 2.2%  
 Other 17 12.5% 
 No response 1 0.8% 
 
Professional Certification 
 Certified public accountant 48 35.3% 
  
Professional Experience in Finance or Accounting 
 Chief financial officer 64 47.1% 
 Public accounting experience 50 36.8% 
 General management 81 59.6% 
 Accounting professor 3 2.2% 
 Controller 28 20.6% 
 Financial/accounting regulator 3 2.2% 
 Other 33 24.3% 
 
Education  
 Bachelors 53 39.0% 
 Masters 64 47.1% 
 JD  11 8.1% 
 PhD/DBA 6 4.4% 




 Revenues of audit committee company  
 Under $500 million  80 58.8% 
 Over $500 million 54 39.7% 









 Panel A: Percentages (Continued) Number Percent 
 
 Industry of audit committee company 
 
 Non-regulated industry 103 75.7% 
 
  Regulated industry (Finance/Insurance) 33 24.3% 
 
 Big 4 accounting firm 91 66.9% 
  
 Internal audit function 
 In-house 76 55.9% 
 Outsourced 21 15.4% 
 Both in-house and outsourced 25 18.4% 
 No internal audit function 14 10.3% 
 
 Internal audit reporting responsibility 
 Primarily to audit committee 62 45.5% 
 Primarily to management 10 7.4% 
 About equally to audit committee 
 and management 50 36.8% 
 Not applicable 14 10.3% 
 
Current Audit Committee Member Service 
 
 Number of participants who are formally 
 designated as financial experts 98 72.1% 
 
 Number of participants who are the   
 audit committee chair for the audit  
 committee company  53 39.0% 
 
 Number of participants who have 
 industry expertise in the same industry 
 as the audit committee company 93 68.4% 
 
 Number of participants who have served 
 on an audit committee (public or private) 
        at the time the company experienced fraud 




 Number of audit committee companies 
 where the CEO is also the chairman of 





 Panel A: Percentages (Continued) Number Percent 
 
 Number of audit committee companies where  
 the CEO is also the founder of the company 
 (n = 135) 27 20.0% 
 
 Number of audit committee companies where  
 the CEO was in place when the participant was  
 appointed to the board (n = 133) 77 57.9%  
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
reports primarily to the AC (45.5%) or about equally (36.8%) to the AC and 
management. Many of the participants bring financial and industry expertise to the AC, 
and are likely to serve as the AC chair. Specifically, 72.1% of the participants are 
formally designated as financial experts, 39.0% serve as the AC chair, 68.4% have 
industry expertise in the same industry as the AC company, and 5.9% have served on an 
AC (public or private) of a company that has experienced fraud. About one third (31.9%) 
of the respondents serve on the AC of companies where the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board, or the CEO is also the founder of the company (20.0%). Further, many 
(57.9%) participants were appointed for AC service when the current CEO was in place.   
 Table 1, Panel B (shown below) presents additional demographic information and 
general information about the participants’ cumulative governance experience, current 
AC service, and other AC experience. In addition, I present information about 
governance processes for the AC company including AC composition and meeting 
processes, and general governance characteristics of the AC company. Collectively, these 
statistics indicate that the participants bring a great deal of accounting, audit committee, 
and governance experience to the board of directors. 
 The participants in the study are typically older and have many years of 





Panel B:  Means Mean Minimum     
   (Median) (Maximum) SD 
 
Age (n = 135) 62.2 44  
   (62.0) (80) 7.06 
 
Cumulative Governance Experience      
  
 Years of accounting experience (n = 135) 27.8 0  
    (30.0) (50) 14.15 
   
 Years of corporate audit committee service  6.7 <1  
    (5.0) (30) 4.50 
 
 Corporate audit committees served in career  2.5 1  
    (2.0) (10) 1.82 
 
Current Audit Committee Member Service 
 
 Number of years served on the board of   5.2 1.5 
 the audit committee company (n = 135) (4.0) (17) 3.17  
       
 Number of years served on audit committee  4.7 1 
 of the audit committee company (n = 135) (4.0) (17) 2.67  
        
Other Audit Committee Experience 
 
 Number of public company audit committees  1.5 0   
 on which participant currently serves (1.0) (4) 0.82 
 
Audit Committee Composition and Meeting Processes 
  
 Number of members serving on the audit   4.0 3 
 committee of the audit committee company (4.0) (8) 1.17  
        
 Number of members on the audit committee   2.2 0 
 designated as financial experts on the audit (2.0) (6) 1.07 
 committee company    
        
 Number of years the chair on the audit  4.7 1 
 committee has served as chair on the audit (4.0) (20) 3.54 
 committee company (n = 135)  
    
 Number of formal audit committee meetings  7.0 1   
 held each year on the audit committee company (7.0) (16) 2.59 





Panel B:  Means (Continued) Mean Minimum  




 Number of directors on the full board of the    
 audit committee company   8.5 4 
  (n = 135)  (8.0) (18) 2.57  
       
 Number of independent directors on the full    
 board  of the audit committee company  6.8 2 
  (n = 135)  (6.0) (17) 2.82  
       
 Number of years the CEO on the audit     
 committee company has been in office  7.8 <1 
  (n = 134)  (5.0) (65) 8.45  
         
 Number of years the CFO on the audit     
 committee company has been in office  5.1 <1 
  (n = 134)  (4.0) (26) 4.49  
 
 
considerable AC service. The age of the participants ranges from 44 (two participants) to 
80 (one participant) with a mean of 62.2. Participants also reported total years of 
accounting experience ranging from zero (15 participants) to 50 (one participant) with a 
mean of 27.8. Participants have corporate AC service ranging from less than one year 
(one participant) to 30 years (one participant) with a mean of 6.7, and have served on one  
(49 participants) to 10 corporate ACs (one participant) during their careers with a mean 
of 2.5.  In regard to current AC service, participants have served on the board of the AC 
company ranging from 1.5 years (one participant) to 17 years (one participant) with a 
mean of 5.2 and have served on the AC ranging from one year (one participant) to 17 





have other AC experience. Participants reported they currently serve on zero ACs (6 
participants)
8
 to four ACs (2 participants) with a mean of 1.5.          
 The participants’ responses to questions about AC composition and meeting 
processes indicate that the participants’ ACs are fairly large and have a relatively high 
number of members formally designated as financial experts. In addition, the AC chair 
has considerable tenure and the number of AC meetings held annually varies widely.  
The number of members on the participants’ ACs range from three (59 participants) to 
eight (2 participants) with a mean of 4.0. The number of AC members designated as 
financial experts ranges from zero (2 participants) to six (1 participant) with a mean of 
2.2. The number of years the chair of the AC has chaired the AC ranges from one (15 
participants) to 20 (2 participants) with a mean of 4.7. The number of formal AC 
meetings held each year ranges from one (1 participant) to 16 (1 participant) with a mean 
of 7.0.  
 Among the AC company governance characteristics, the participants reported that 
their AC companies are typically led by CEOs and CFOs with considerable tenure, but 
the boards of directors are largely comprised of directors who are formally independent 
of management. The number of directors on the full board ranges from four (2 
participants) to 18 (1 participant) with a mean of 8.5. The total number of independent 
directors on the full board ranges from two (1 participant) to 17 (1 participant) with a 
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 Six participants do not currently serve on an audit committee (apparently had rolled off just prior to the 
survey mailing) but have served on several public company audit committees in the recent past (1, 2, 2, 2, 
2, and 3 total audit committees ever served, respectively). If these six participants are deleted from the 
sample, the results in Table 6, Panels A – D are similar, except that PTCEO is not significant in Panels B 






mean of 6.8. The tenure of the CEOs of the AC companies ranges from less than one year 
(1 participant) to 65 years (1 participant) with a mean tenure of 7.8, and the tenure of the 
CFOs is slightly less ranging from less than one year (1 participant) to 26 years (1 
participant) with a mean of 5.1.  
 Table 1, Panel C (shown below), presents the industry distribution of the AC 
firms, indicating that participants serve on the ACs of companies in diverse industries. 
The industries represented by the participants’ AC company are dominated by the finance 
industry followed by healthcare/pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing, and technology 
industries. These industries account for 64% of the respondents. The industry distribution 
appears reasonably consistent with the fraud company profiles in Beasley et al. (1999, 

















Panel C:  Industry Distribution n        Percent 
 
  
 Finance/Banking  30 22.1% 
 Healthcare/Pharmaceuticals  20 14.7% 
 Manufacturing  20 14.7% 
 Technology  17 12.5% 
 Energy/Utilities  11 8.1% 
 Real Estate  5 3.7% 
 Service Organization  5 3.7% 
 Communications/Media  4 2.9%  
 Retail Trade  4 2.9% 
 Telecommunications  3 2.2% 
 Transportation/Logistics  3 2.2% 
 Insurance  3 2.2% 
 No response  1 0.7% 
 Other   10 7.4% 
    ___ _____ 





  Table 2 presents the study’s descriptive statistics. Overall, the participants’ 
responses appear consistent with the findings of Beasley et al. (2009) of delegated fraud 
oversight by AC members and lack of consensus on the AC about the AC’s role in 
assessing fraud risk. Further, I find that participants’ reliance on each corporate 
governance actor largely mirrors participants’ perceptions of each actor’s responsibility 
for assessing fraud risk. Surprisingly, AC members do not perceive the other AC 
members or themselves to be as responsible for assessing fraud risk as they perceive 
management or the internal or external auditors to be. I also find variations in the actual 
actions that AC members take to assess fraud risk and management’s integrity. 
 Table 2, Panel A (shown below), presents the participants’ reliance on 
management and other corporate governance actors. The participants rely heaviest on the  





TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics (n = 136) 
 
Panel A:  Audit committee reliance on others Mean Minimum  




       Chief Executive Officer 68.9 10   
  (70.0) (100) 19.66 
 
       Chief Financial Officer      80.3 15   
 (82.5) (100) 15.27  
Audit Committee 
 
       Other audit committee members 56.7 5  
  (55.0) (100) 22.15  
 
      Yourself (n = 135) 67.6 10   
  (70.0)  (100) 19.27  
Other Corporate Governance Actors 
 
       Other independent directors 42.4 0   
        (not on the audit committee) (n = 135)  (45.0) (100) 25.13 
 
       Head of internal audit (n = 122)  79.2 22  
  (80.5) (100) 14.93      
  
       External audit partner  82.3 35   
  (85.0) (100) 13.09 
 
Note: Based on paired t-tests, the means are as follows (p < 0.05 for differences): external 
audit partner = CFO = head of internal audit > CEO = yourself > other audit committee 
members > other independent directors. 
 
 
 “total reliance”; SD = 13.09; range = 35-100), followed by the CFO (mean of RELCFO 
= 80.3; SD = 15.27; range = 15-100), and the head of internal audit (mean of RELIA = 
79.2; SD = 14.93; range = 22-100). The participants rely less heavily on the CEO (mean 
of RELCEO = 68.9; SD =19.66; range = 10-100) and themselves (mean of RELSELF = 





over rely on the CEO, but raising questions about AC members’ self-reliance. The 
participants rely moderately on other AC members (mean of RELOAC = 56.7; SD = 
22.15; range = 5-100) and least heavily on other independent directors (mean of RELOID 
= 42.4; SD = 25.13; range = 0-100). The low level of reliance on other independent 
directors is consistent with recent findings by the Center for Audit Quality which found 
that players in the financial reporting chain (e.g., corporate directors, financial executives, 
external auditors, and internal auditors) (CAQ, 2013) have the least amount of confidence 
in the board of directors and the AC to identify a potential material misstatement due to 
fraud. This finding raises questions about whether AC members can build coalitions 
within the AC, and the board as a whole (e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Stevenson & 
Radin, 2009), to combat fraud if AC members do not perceive they can rely heavily on 
other AC members or other independent directors to assess fraud risk.  
 Table 2, Panel B (shown below), presents the participants’ perceptions of 
management and other corporate governance actors’ responsibility for assessing fraud 
risk. AC members’ perception of others responsibility is an exploratory variable, and I 
find that AC members’ perceptions of responsibility are similar to their reliance on others 
to assess fraud risks. However, participants place a great deal of responsibility on the 
CFO, which is potentially problematic because CFOs, as well as CEOs, are more likely to 
be associated with incidences of FFR (Beasley et al., 2010). Overall, participants perceive 
that the CFO is most responsible for assessing fraud risk (mean of RESCFO = 91.4 on a 
scale of 0 = “no responsibility” and 100 = “total responsibility”; SD = 7.98; range = 55-
100), followed by the external audit partner (mean of RESEAP = 85.7; SD = 13.46; range 





Panel B:  Audit committee perceptions of  
                 others responsibility for assessing   Mean Minimum  




       Chief Executive Officer (n = 134) 83.0 20  
  (86.0) (100) 14.86  
 
       Chief Financial Officer (n = 134)       91.4 55   




       Other audit committee members (n = 134) 68.3 15  
  (70.0) (100) 22.56 
 
Yourself (n = 134) 72.0 16  
  (75.0) (100) 21.57  
 
Other Corporate Governance Actors 
 
      Other independent directors 49.4 0   
      (not on the audit committee) (n = 133) (50.0) (100) 24.88 
 
      Head of internal audit (n = 120)       85.4 35  
  (90.0) (100) 13.40      
  
 
      External audit partner (n = 134)  85.7 25  
  (90.0) (100) 13.46 
 
Note: Based on paired t-tests, the means are as follows (p < 0.05 for differences): CFO > 
external audit partner = head of internal audit = CEO > yourself > other audit committee 
members > other independent directors. 
 
35-100), and the CEO (mean of RESCEO = 83.0; SD =14.86; range = 20-100). The 
participants perceived themselves (mean of RESELF = 72.0; SD = 21.57; range = 16-
100) and the other AC members (mean of RESOAC = 68.3; SD = 22.56; range = 15-100) 
as significantly less responsible, and other independent directors not on the AC as the 





are consistent with the CAQ’s (2013) finding that the players in the financial reporting 
chain largely perceive corporate executives have the primary role in deterring and 
detecting financial reporting fraud. However, the participants in the CAQ study did not 
report as strong a perception that internal and external auditors were as responsible for 
detecting financial reporting fraud as the participants in this study perceived them to be. 
This highlights the CAQ’s (2013) overall finding that there are expectation gaps among 
financial supply chain participants about the role of each participant.   
 Table 2, Panel C (shown below), presents the specific actions participants’ ACs 
take to assess fraud risk. Overall, there is a lack of consensus with a wide variation  
between the most common, and least common AC actions to assess fraud risk (medians 
range from 52 to 90). Further, AC actions to actively search for fraud risks are among the 
least common possibly reflecting delegation of fraud risk oversight by AC members to 
other corporate governance actors. The participants reported their most likely action is 
having regular interactions with management (mean of ACAINTER = 88.5 on a scale of 
0 = “not at all” and 100 = “a great deal”, SD = 10.75, range = 25-100) followed by 
assessing the character of management (mean of ACACHAR = 88.3; SD = 10.66; range 
= 45-100). The participants are equally likely to actively promote the company’s 
whistleblower hotline (mean of ACAWHISTLE = 75.8; SD = 23.57, range = 0-100) and 
to closely analyze reserves and other financial statement areas where fraud could occur  
(mean of ACAANALYZE = 74.1; SD = 21.66, range = 5-100). AC actions to actively 
search for fraud risks are moderately prevalent (mean of ACASEARCH = 65.8; SD = 






Panel C:  Audit committee actions to assess  Mean Minimum  
  fraud risk (n = 135) (Median) (Maximum) SD 
 
      Closely analyze reserves and other financial     
      statement areas where fraud could occur 74.1 5 
 (ACANALYZE) (80.0) (100) 21.66  
 
      Assesses the character of management 88.3 45 
 (ACACHAR) (90.0) (100) 10.66 
      
      Has regular interactions with management 88.5 25 
 (ACAINTER) (90.0) (100) 10.75 
     
     Actively promotes the company’s       
      whistleblower hotline  75.8 0 
 (ACAWHISTLE) (84.0) (100) 23.57 
    
      Actively searches for fraud risks 65.8 0 
 (ACASEARCH) (70.0) (100) 23.35 
     
 Reviews officers’ expenses (annually) to     
      assess financial statement fraud risks 48.2 0 
 (ACAEXPENSE) (52.0) (100) 32.35 
Note: Based on paired t-tests, the means are as follows (p < 0.05 for differences): 




 (annually) to assess financial statement fraud risks (mean of ACAEXPENSE = 48.2; SD 
= 32.35, range = 0-100). 
 Table 2, Panel D (shown below), presents actual actions participants’ ACs take to 
assess management’s integrity. I find a smaller variation between the most common and 
least common actions to assess management’s integrity (medians range from 80 to 90) 
than I did with AC actions to assess fraud risk. Thus, the participants’ ACs appear to have 
more consensus about how to assess management’s integrity. The participants reported 
that they were most likely to observe management’s transparency/openness (mean of 





Panel D:  Audit committee actions to assess Mean Minimum  
  management’s integrity (n = 136) (Median) (Maximum) SD 
 
      Assesses management’s body language 73.9 5  
 (MIBODY) (80.0) (100) 20.88  
 
      Observes management’s transparency/  88.1 50  
      openness (MIOPEN) (90.0) (100) 9.76  
 
      Observes how management reacts in   86.6 45 
      pressure situations (MIPRESS) (90.0) (100) 11.05  
 
      Observes whether management is defensive 84.0 30  
 (MIDEFEN) (85.0) (100) 14.26  
 
      Monitors the whistleblower hotline 76.1 0  
 (MIWHISTLE) (85.0) (100) 25.39  
 
Note: Based on paired t-tests, the means are as follows (p < 0.05 for differences): 
MIOPEN > MIPRESS > MIDEFEN > MIWHISTLE = MIBODY. 
 
 
50-100); followed by observing how management reacts in pressure situations (mean of 
MIPRESS = 86.6; SD = 11.05, range = 45-100); and observing whether management is 
defensive (mean of MIDEFEN = 84.0; SD = 14.26, range = 30-100). Participants were  
equally likely to monitor the whistleblower hotline (mean of MIWHISTLE = 76.1; SD = 
25.39, range = 0-100) and assess management’s body language (mean of MIBODY = 
73.9; SD = 20.88, range = 5-100). 
  Table 2, Panel E (shown below), presents a detail of the nominal measures of the 
participants’ personal and professional relationship ties (e.g., each relationship tie was 
coded as 1 = yes and 0 = no). Overall, the participants reported a greater number of 
professional ties than personal ties. One participant noted that most board members of the 






Panel E:  Reported number of audit  No. of Ties Mean Minimum  
  committee relationship ties  (%)      (Median) (Maximum) SD 
 
Personal ties:       
 
 Personal ties to the CEO  13 0.1 0  
 (PSCEO) (n = 135) (9.6%) (0.0) (1) 0.30  
 
      Personal ties to the CFO 4  <0.1 0  
      (PSCFO) (n = 135) (3.0%) (0.0) (1) 0.17  
 
      Personal ties to other AC members 14 0.1 0  
 (PSOAC) (n = 135) (10.4%) (0.0) (1) 0.31  
 
      Personal ties to other independent  13 0.1 0  
 directors (PSOID) (n = 135) (9.6%) (0.0) (1) 0.30 
 
 Personal ties to the head of internal  0 0.0 0 
 audit (PSIA) (n = 121) (0%) (0.0) (0) 0.00 
 
 Personal ties to the external audit  0 0.0 0 
 partner (PSEAP) (n = 135) (0%) (0.0) (0) 0.00 
 
Professional ties:       
 
 Professional ties to the CEO  24 0.2 0  
 (PTCEO) (n = 136) (17.6%) (0.0) (1) 0.38  
 
      Professional ties to the CFO 12  <0.1 0  
      (PTCFO) (n = 136) (8.8%) (0.0) (1) 0.29  
 
      Professional ties to other AC  31  0.2 0  
 members (PTOAC) (n = 135) (23.0%) (0.0) (1) 0.42  
 
      Professional ties to other independent  33 0.2 0  
 directors (PTOID) (n = 136) (24.3%) (0.0) (1) 0.43 
 
 Professional ties to the head of  2  <0.1 0 
 internal audit (PTIA) (n = 122) (1.6%) (0.0) (1) 0.13 
 
 Professional ties to the external  4  <0.1 0 









lesser likelihood of social interaction. This explanation appears to be reasonable, but may 
not be representative of all participants in the study. 
 The participants had nearly identical numbers of personal ties to the CEO (n = 13, 
mean of PSCEO = 0.1; SD = 0.30, range = 0-1), other AC members (n = 14, mean of 
PSOAC = 0.1 SD = 0.31), and other independent directors (n = 13, mean of PSOID = 0.1; 
SD = 0.30). Participants reported relatively fewer personal ties to the CFO (n = 4, mean 
of PSCFO < 0.1; SD = 0.17), and no personal ties to the head of internal audit (PSIA) and  
the external audit partner (PSEAP). The participants reported a similar number of 
professional ties to other AC members (n = 31, mean of PTOAC = 0.2; SD = 0.42) and to 
other independent directors (n = 33, mean of PTOID = 0.2; SD = 0.43), but had 
somewhat fewer professional ties to the CEO (n = 24, mean of PTCEO = 0.2; SD = 0.38) 
and to the CFO (n = 12, mean of PTCFO < 0.1; SD = 0.29). The participants had even 
fewer number of professional ties with the external audit partner (n = 4, mean of PTEAP 
< 0.1; SD = 0.17) and the least number with the head of internal audit (n = 2, mean of 
PTIA < 0.1; SD = 0.13).  
Open-ended Responses 
 Table 3 presents participants’ responses to open-ended questions asking 
participants to discuss their reasons for relying heavily on other parties to assess fraud 
risk (Panel A); their reasons for assigning the responsibility for detecting fraud to other 
parties (Panel B); other means the AC uses to assess fraud risk (Panel C); and other 
means the AC uses to assess management’s integrity (Panel D).
9
 Overall, the responses 
 
9
 Two investigators independently coded the questions in this section. These two sets of codes were 





reflected that participants assign many of the same reasons to reliance and responsibility. 
In several instances, participants indicated that they did not perceive a difference between 
reliance and responsibility. Further, participants indicated that their ACs employ a wide 
variety of strategies to assess fraud risk and management’s integrity, supporting the 
finding of Beasley et al. (2009, p. 98) that “there is no consensus activity” that ACs 
employ to assess fraud risk. 
 Table 3, Panel A (shown below), presents participants’ reasons for relying heavily 
on other parties to assess FFR risk. Participants reported their reliance is mostly due to 
fiduciary responsibility (n = 33) followed by due to general knowledge (n = 28) and 
expertise/abilities (n = 27). To a lesser extent, participants rely on others because of their 
close proximity to the financial reporting process (n = 17) and because of independence 
(n = 17). Taken as a whole, participants appear to be more motivated to rely on others 

















TABLE 3. Responses to open-ended questions 
 
Panel A:  Primary reasons audit committee members rely heavily  
  on other parties to assess fraud risk   n 
 
Fiduciary responsibility   33 
General knowledge   28 
Expertise/abilities  27  
Close proximity to financial reporting process  17  
Independence  17 
Other  11  
Experience  10  
Role in setting “tone at top”  10  
Character/integrity  10  
Knowledge of the company  10  
Access to information   9 
Best position to detect/deter fraud   8  
Liability risk  8 
Trust  4 
Position/authority  4 
Own personal experience  3 
    
 
 Table 3, Panel B (shown below), presents participants’ reasons for assigning the 
responsibility for detecting fraud to other parties. Overall, participants assigned the same 
reasons for assigning the responsibility to other parties as they did for their reasons for 
relying heavily on other parties; however, a large number of participants assigned 
responsibility due to fiduciary responsibility (n = 52), and to a much lesser extent due to 
position/authority (n = 12), expertise/abilities (n = 10), role in setting the “tone at the top” 
(n = 9), and liability risk (n = 9). Given there was a wide variation in participants’ 
perceptions of each corporate actor’s responsibility for assessing fraud risk (Table 2, 
Panel B), participants may also hold widely varying perceptions about each actor’s 
fiduciary responsibilities. This could be problematic if participants are delegating their 






Panel B:  Primary reasons audit committee members assign the  
  responsibility for detecting fraud to other parties   n  
 
Fiduciary responsibility  52 
Position/authority  12 
Expertise/abilities  10 
Role in setting “tone at top”  9 
Liability risk  9 
Close proximity to financial reporting process  8 
Knowledge of the company  7 
General knowledge  6 
Independence  5 
Best positioned to detect fraud  5 
Access to information  4 
Character/integrity  4 
Accountability  4 
General experience  3 
Own personal experience  2 
Other  7 
 
 
fact, the academic literature has found that AC members are more likely to be severely 
penalized by incidences of FFR (Abbott, Park, & Parker, 2000; Srinivasan, 2005).  
 Table 3, Panel C (shown below), presents other means the AC uses to assess fraud 
risk. Overall, participants’ responses reflected many of the BRC’s (1999) “guiding 
principles” for best AC practices including independent communication and information 
flow between the AC and internal audit (Principle 2), external auditors (Principle 3), and 
management (Principle 4). However, there was less emphasis on continuing education 
and training (Principle 5). Participants reported that they are more likely to meet with 
external audit regularly (n = 25) and internal audit regularly (n = 18), and often these 






Panel C:  Other means the audit committee uses to  
  assess fraud risk  n  
 
Meet with external audit regularly  25 
Meet with internal audit regularly  18  
Review financial statements or internal controls  14  
Meet without management present  10  
Ask probing questions  7 
Meet with management regularly  6  
Oversee/direct internal audit  5  
Review/assess company risks  5  
Meet with second level staff  4  
Make inquiries regarding fraud risks  4  
Engage outside professionals  3  
Assess fraud hotline  2  
Review company filings/analyst reports  2  
Encourage open communications  1  
Promote compliance programs  1  
Obtain continuing education and training  1  
Other   12  
 
reviewing financial statements or internal controls (n = 14) and asking probing questions 
to obtain information (n = 7). These actions are consistent with findings in previous AC 
oversight studies (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron & Bédard, 
2006) and Roberts et al.’s (2005) finding that directors often use probing questions to 
establish accountability which can enhance one’s reputation (e.g., Jensen, 2006).   
 Table 3, Panel D (shown below), presents other means the AC uses to assess 
management’s integrity. In general, many participants use similar means to assess fraud 
risk and management’s integrity, and overall, there was an emphasis on enhancing 
communications and assessing management representations. These actions are consistent 
with the consensus view of other players in the financial reporting supply that there is a 






Panel D:  Other means the audit committee uses to 
  assess management’s integrity  n  
 
Communicate or meet with other corporate governance     
actors without management present  22  
Assess clarity and reasonableness of management representations 12 
Communicate or meet with management outside of formal meetings 11 
Observe management’s openness/transparency  6  
Meet with second level staff  5  
Assess management’s ethics  4  
Ask probing questions  3  
Assess company hotline  3  
Assess “tone at top”  2  
Generally observe inside and outside of board meetings 2  
Look for management consistency  2  
Observe how management conducts their personal lives 2  
Examine how management handles situations  2  
Engage in social activities outside of board meetings  1  
Assess management’s reputation  1  
Other  10  
 
reported their ACs communicated or met with other corporate governance actors without 
management present. Further, participants (n = 12) placed importance on the clarity and 
reasonableness of management representations and communicated and met with 
management outside of formal meetings (n=11). 
Results of Hypotheses Testing 
 
 The model in this study includes multiple independent variables (MEASURES 
OF PROFESSIONAL TIES, MEASURES OF PERSONAL TIES) and dependent 
variables (RELIANCE ON CEO/CFO, RELIANCE ON OTHER CORPORATE 
GOVRENANCE ACTORS, and RELIANCE ON AC’S OWN EFFORTS). First, I used 
multiple regression analysis (Table 4) and MANOVA (Table 5) to examine the 
hypothesized relationships between the dependent variables of (RELIANCE ON 





ACTORS, and RELIANCE ON AC’S OWN EFFORTS) and the independent variables 
of (MEASURES OF PROFESSIONAL TIES and MEASURES OF PERSONAL TIES), 
finding no significant relationship. I then used regression analysis to analyze the 
associations between the dependent variables (AC ACTIONS TO ASSESS FFR RISK 
AND MANAGEMENT’S INTEGRITY) and the independent variables of (MEASURES 
OF PROFESSIONAL TIES and MEASURES OF PERSONAL TIES) (Table 6) taking 
into account control variables derived from exploratory analysis. Thus, Table 6 reflects 
an alternative method of testing H3a, H3b, and H3c. 
Multivariate Regression Results 
 In Table 4, Panel A (shown below), I examine the association between the 
strength of AC members’ personal and professional relationship ties to management and 
other corporate governance actors (H1a, H1b, H1c) and AC members’ reliance on the 
CEO and CFO to assess fraud risk (calculated as RELCEO+RELCFO). I predicted AC 
members’ personal ties to the CEO/CFO (SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH) would be 
positively associated with AC members’ reliance on the CEO/CFO (SUMRELMGT) and 
there would be a less positive association with AC members’ professional ties 
(SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH). I also made no directional prediction about the relationship 
between AC members’ personal (SUMPSOGASTRENGTH) and professional 
(SUMPTOGASTRENGTH) ties to other corporate governance actors and other AC 
members (PSOACSTRENGTH/ PTOACSTRENGTH) and reliance on the CEO/CFO 







Table 4- Panel A 
Regression Results  
DV = RELIANCE ON MANAGEMENT  
(SUMRELMGT) 
n = 113 
Variable Predicted Sign Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 150.92 41.19 0.000 
SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH   + (H1a) -0.05 -0.30 0.765 
SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH  + (H1b) 0.03 0.37 0.358 
SUMPSOGASTRENGTH  +/- (H1c) 0.09 0.47 0.636 
SUMPTOGASTRENGTH  +/- (H1c) -0.10 -0.86 0.394 
PSOACSTRENGTH  +/- (H1c) -0.29 -1.26 0.212 
PTOACSTRENGTH +/- (H1c) 0.10 0.74 0.460 








F-statistic 0.56  




SUMRELMGT =    calculated variable = RELCEO+RELCFO measuring AC  
    members’ reliance on the CEO and the CFO when   
    assessing fraud risk with each item measured on a 101  
    point scale anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total  
    reliance (possible total score range 0-200); 
 
SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH =  calculated variable = PSCEOSTRENGTH+ 
    PSCFOSTRENGTH measuring AC members’ perception  
    of the strength of their personal ties to the CEO and the  
    CFO with each item measured on a 101 point scale   
    anchored 0 = very weak tie and 100 = very strong tie  
    (possible total score range 0-200); 
 
SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH =  calculated variable = PTCEOSTRENGTH+ 
    PTCFOSTRENGTH measuring AC members’ perception  
    of the strength of their professional ties to the CEO and the  
    CFO with each item measured on a 101 point scale   
    anchored 0 = very weak tie and 100 = very strong tie  











Variable Definitions (Continued): 
 
SUMPSOGASTRENGTH =  calculated variable = PSOID+PSEAP+PSIA measuring  
    audit measuring AC members’ perception of the strength of 
    their personal ties to the other independent directors, the  
    external audit partner, and the head of internal audit with  
    each item measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = very  
    weak tie and 100 = very strong tie (possible total score  
    range 0-300); 
 
SUMPTOGASTRENGTH =  calculated variable = PTOID+PTEAP+PTIA measuring  
    audit measuring AC members’ perception of the strength of 
    their professional ties to the other independent directors,  
    the external audit partner, and the head of internal audit  
    with each item measured on a 101 point scale anchored  
    0 = very weak tie and 100 = very strong tie (possible total  
    score range 0-300); 
 
PSOACSTRENGTH =   AC members’ perception of the strength of their personal  
    relationship ties to other AC members on a 101 point scale  
    anchored 0 = very weak tie and 100 = very strong tie; 
 
PTOACSTRENGTH =   AC members’ perception of the strength of their   
    professional relationship ties to other AC members on a  
    101 point scale anchored 0 = very weak tie and 100 =   







 Thus, hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c were not supported.  
 In Table 4, Panel B (shown below), I examine the association between the 
strength of AC members’ personal and professional relationship ties to management and 
other corporate governance actors (H2a, H2b, H2c) and AC members’ reliance on other 
corporate governance actors (e.g., other independent directors, external audit partner, 
head of internal) (calculated as RELOID+RELEAP+RELIA). I predicted AC members’ 
personal ties to the CEO/CFO (SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH) would be negatively 
associated with AC members’ reliance on other corporate governance actors  
 
10






Table 4- Panel B 
Regression Results  
DV = RELIANCE ON OTHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ACTORS 
 (SUMRELOGA) 
n = 113 
Variable Predicted Sign Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 202.09 46.93 0.000 
SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH   - (H2a) -0.05 -0.22 0.415 
SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH - (H2b) 0.08 0.83 0.406 
SUMPSOGASTRENGTH +/- (H2c) 0.05 0.23 0.818 
SUMPTOGASTRENGTH +/- (H2c) -0.04 -0.26 0.797 
PSOACSTRENGTH +/- (H2c) -0.07 -0.26 0.799 
PTOACSTRENGTH +/- (H2c) 0.10 0.61 0.546 








F-statistic 0.22  




SUMRELOGA =   calculated variable = RELOID+RELEAP+RELIA measuring AC  
   members’ reliance on other independent directors not on the AC,  
   the external audit partner, and the head of internal audit when  
   assessing fraud risk with each item measured on a 101 point scale  
   anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total reliance (possible total  
   score range 0-300). 
 
(SUMRELOGA), and there would be a less negative association for AC members’ 
professional ties (SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH). I also made no directional prediction 
between AC members’ personal (SUMPSOGASTRENGTH) and professional 
(SUMPTOGASTRENGTH) ties to other corporate governance actors and other AC 
members (PSOACSTRENGTH/ PTOACSTRENGTH) and AC members’ reliance on the 
other corporate governance actors (SUMRELOGA). I found the overall model was not 
significant with F = 0.22, p = 0.968, R
2
 = 1.25%. Thus, hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c 






 In Table 4, Panel C (shown below), I examine the association between the 
strength of AC members’ personal and professional relationship ties to management and 
other corporate governance actors, which are included in hypotheses (H3a, H3b, H3c), 
and AC members’ reliance on other AC members and themselves (calculated as 
RELOAC+ RELSELF). I predicted AC members’ personal ties to the CEO/CFO 
(SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH) would be negatively associated with AC members’ reliance 
on themselves and other AC members (SUMRELAC), and there would be a less negative 
association between AC members’ professional ties to the CEO/CFO 
(SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH). I also made no directional prediction about AC members’ 
personal (SUMPSOGASTRENGTH) and professional (SUMPTOGASTRENGTH) ties 
to other corporate governance actors and AC members’ personal (PSOACSTRENGTH) 
and professional ties (PTOACSTRENGTH) to other AC members, and AC members’ 
reliance on themselves and other AC members (SUMRELAC). I found the overall model 
was not significant with F = 0.51, p = 0.803, R
2
 = 2.78%. Thus, hypotheses H3a, H3b, 













Table 4- Panel C 
Regression Results  
DV = RELIANCE ON AUDIT COMMITTEE  
(SUMRELAC) 
n = 113 
Variable Predicted Sign Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 124.37 28.99 0.000 
SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH - (H3a) -0.07 -0.35 0.365 
SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH - (H3b) 0.15 1.51 0.134 
SUMPSOGASTRENGTH +/- (H3c) -0.02 -0.10 0.924 
SUMPTOGASTRENGTH +/- (H3c) -0.12 -0.88 0.383 
PSOACSTRENGTH +/- (H3c) 0.12 0.46 0.649 
PTOACSTRENGTH +/- (H3c) -0.05 -0.33 0.740 








F-statistic 0.51  




SUMRELAC =   calculated variable = RELOAC+RELSELF measuring AC   
   members’ reliance on other AC members and AC members’  
   reliance on themselves when assessing fraud risk with each item  
   measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = no reliance and  




 In Table 5, I more deeply examine the association between AC members’ 
personal and professional relationship ties and AC members’ reliance on others to assess 
FFR risk by focusing on the existence of relationship ties rather than the strength of 
relationship ties. The limited number of participants with relationship ties made the 
relationship strength variables less useful than expected. Further, measuring the existence 
of the ties is consistent with previous archival and experimental archival studies (e.g., 





Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan 
et al., 2011). 
 In Table 5, Panel A (shown below), I examine the association between the 
existence of personal and professional ties to the CEO (PSCEO/PTCFO) and CFO 
(PSCFO/PTCFO) (measured as 1 = yes, 0 = no), and AC members’ reliance on the CEO 
(RELCFO) and CFO (RELCFO). The model was not significant, F = 1.45, p = 0.175.   
 
Table 5 – Panel A 
Results of MANOVA 
DVs = RELIANCE ON MANAGEMENT 
 (RELCEO, RELCFO) 
n = 135 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 1.45 0.175 
PSCEO 2.62 0.076 
PTCEO 0.38 0.686 
PSCFO 2.81 0.064 




RELCEO =    AC members’ perception of their reliance on the CEO when  
   assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = no 
   reliance and 100 = total reliance; 
RELCFO =    AC members’ perception of their reliance on the CFO when  
   assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = no 
   reliance and 100 = total reliance; 
PSCEO =   AC members with personal ties to the CEO = 1 if yes, 0 if no;  
PTCEO =   AC members with professional ties to the CEO = 1 if yes, 0 if no; 
PSCFO =   AC members with personal ties to the CFO = 1 if yes, 0 if no;  
PTCFO =  AC members with professional ties to the CFO = 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
 
 In Table 5, Panel B (shown below), I expand the model and include other AC 
members and other independent directors. Specifically, I examined the association 





 Table 5 – Panel B 
Results of MANOVA 
DVs = RELIANCE ON CEO, CFO, AUDIT COMMITTEE, 
AND OTHER INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
(RELCEO, RELCFO, RELOAC, RELOID)  
n = 133 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 1.04 0.409 
PSCEO 1.44 0.226 
PTCEO 1.34 0.259 
PSCFO 2.22 0.071 
PTCFO 1.21 0.310 
PSOAC 0.75 0.563 
PTOAC 0.63 0.644 
PSOID 0.72 0.578 





RELOAC =   AC members’ perception of their reliance on the other AC members when  
  assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = no  
  reliance and 100 = total reliance; 
RELOID =   AC members’ perception of their reliance on the other independent  
  directors not on the AC when assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point 
  scale anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total reliance; 
PSOAC =  AC members with personal ties to other audit committee members = 1 if  
  yes, 0 if no; 
PTOAC =  AC members with professional ties to other AC members = 1 if yes, 0 if  
  no; 
PSOID =  AC members with personal ties to other independent directors not on the  
  AC = 1 if yes, 0 if no; 
PTOID =  AC members with professional ties to other independent directors not on  
  the AC = 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
 
(PSCEO/PTCEO), CFO (PSCFO/PTCFO), AC (PSOAC/PTOAC), and other 
independent directors (PSOID/PTOID) (measured as 1 = yes, 0 = no), and AC members’ 









 In Table 5, Panel C (shown below), I further expand the model and include 
internal and external auditors. Participants reported no personal ties to the head of 
internal audit or the external audit partner; therefore, I only include the reported 
professional ties. In this model, I examined the association between the existence of 
personal and professional relationship ties with the CEO (PSCEO/PTCEO), CFO 
(PSCFO/PTCFO), AC (PSOAC/PTOAC), other independent directors (PSOID/PTOID), 
and the professional ties to the head of internal audit (PTIA) and the external audit 
partner (PTEAP) (measured as 1 = yes, 0 = no), and AC members’ reliance on the CEO 
(RELCEO), CFO (RELCFO), other AC members (RELOAC), other independent 
directors (RELOID), head of internal audit (RELIA), and external audit partner 


















Table 5 – Panel C 
Results of MANOVA 
DVs = RELIANCE ON MANAGEMENT, AUDIT 
COMMITTEE, OTHER INDEPENDENT BOARD 
DIRECORS, HEAD OF INTERNAL AUDIT AND 
EXTERNAL AUDIT PARTNER  
(RELCEO, RELCFO, RELOAC, RELOID, RELIA, RELEAP) 
n = 119 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 1.01 0.467 
PSCEO 0.98 0.443 
PTCEO 0.51 0.810 
PSCFO 1.78 0.111 
PTCFO 1.10 0.370 
PSOAC 0.28 0.945 
PTOAC 2.04 0.067 
PSOID 0.71 0.643 
PTOID 1.01 0.424 
PTIA* 2.78 0.015 




RELIA =    AC members’ perception of their reliance on the head of internal  
   audit when assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale  
   anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total reliance; 
RELEAP =    AC members’ perception of their reliance on the external audit  
   partner when assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale  
   anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total reliance; 
PTIA =   AC members with professional ties to other the head of internal  
   audit = 1 if yes, 0 if no; 
PTEAP =   AC members with professional ties to the external audit partner = 1 
   if yes, 0 if no. 
 
* Participants reported professional, but no personal ties to the head of internal audit and 
the external audit partner. 
 
 Overall, the results of the MANOVAs indicated no significant relations between 
social ties between AC members and the CEO/CFO and other corporate governance 





results, as well as those of the regression models, differ from the results of the previous 
archival studies; however, the scope of this study and that of the archival studies 
significantly differ. This study focuses on a specific AC process and relationships among 
multiple corporate actors, whereas the previous archival studies (e.g., Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al. 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a; Dey & Liu, 2011; 
Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan et al., 2011) 
focus on more tangible accounting outcomes (e.g., earnings management, management 
compensation, turnover-performance sensitivity) and management-director relationship 
ties. Questions about “AC reliance” are less specific and tangible than established 
measures of accounting outcomes. Thus, there are issues of comparability. In addition, 
this study uses the survey approach, which is dependent on generating sufficient 
responses to establish significant relationships among the variables of interest. The 
archival approach offers the advantage of ease of access to publicly available data for a 
large number of companies that can be used to establish relationship ties and to measure 
established corporate governance variables. As such, the previous archival studies may 
have been better able to establish significant relationship ties. On the other hand, this 
study is limited by the number of self-reported relationship ties and the more general, less 
tangible measures of “AC reliance”. As such, I included additional analysis that focused 
more on more specific AC actions to assess FFR risk and management integrity. 
Specifically, I performed additional analyses including examining associations between 
measures of relationship ties and tangible AC actions to assess FFR risk and 






Alternative Testing of H3a, H3b, and H3c 
 
 In Table 6, I provide another analysis of the issues in H3a, H3b, and H3c 
regarding AC members’ personal and professional relationships and specific actions the 
AC takes to assess FFR risk and management’s integrity. I ran regression models for the 
dependent variable of AC reliance on its own actions
12
 and examined the influence of a 
variety of potential demographic/governance control variables, finding three notable 
variables: percentage of independent board members (BODPCTIND), the natural log of 
audit committee size (LOGACSIZE), and gender (GENDER).
13
 I examined models that 
included or excluded professional ties to the internal and external auditors to assess if the 
presence, or lack thereof, of these ties impacts any of the associations between 
relationship ties and the corporate governance variables, and AC actions to assess FFR 
risk and management’s integrity.  
 In Table 6, Panel A (shown below), I examine the relationship between the AC’s 
own actions to assess FFR risk (SUMMACATIONS) and the existence of personal and 
professional ties to the CEO/CFO, and the other corporate governance actors, excluding 
the internal and external auditors, controlling for board independence, the natural log of 
AC size, and gender. Specifically, I use the following model: 
 SUMACACTIONS =                               
                                                  
                                        .  
 
12
 AC reliance on its own efforts to assess fraud risk includes two separate summated measures: AC actions 
to assess fraud risk (SUMACACTIONS) and AC actions to assess management’s integrity 
(SUMMIACTIONS). 
13
 The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity in each of the 





Table 6- Panel A 
Regression Results  
DV = AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS FRAUD RISK  
(SUMACACTIONS)** 
 EXCLUDING AUDITORS 
n = 132 
Variable
14
 Predicted Sign Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 311.01 6.61 0.000* 
PSCEO - (H3a) -91.56 -2.98 0.002* 
PTCEO - (H3b) 20.04 1.04 0.302 
PSCFO - (H3a) 41.45 1.20 0.232 
PTCFO - (H3b) 8.30 0.26 0.797 
PSOAC +/- (H3c) -6.03 -0.21 0.836 
PTOAC +/- (H3c) -18.47 -0.96 0.339 
PSOID +/- (H3c) -46.51 -1.44 0.153 
PTOID +/- (H3c) 44.12 2.57 0.011* 
BODPCTIND ? 92.07 1.63 0.106 
LOGACSIZE ? 123.24 2.26 0.026* 
GENDER ? -14.46 -0.72 0.475 








F-statistic 2.39  
 p = 0.010 
 




SUMACACTIONS =  calculated variable = ACAANALYZE+ACACHAR+ 
   ACAINTER+ACAWHISTLE+ACASEARCH+ 
   ACAEXPENSE measuring the sum of specific audit  
  committee actions performed to assess fraud risk with each  
  item measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = not at all  




BODPCTIND =    percentage of independent directors on the board of   
  directors; 
LOGACSIZE =    natural logarithm of number of members on the audit  
  committee; 
 
14
 The VIF scores for all the variables are 1.77 or below, mean VIF = 1.34, indicating multicollinearity is 






Variable Definitions (Continued): 
 
GENDER =    1 if male, 0 if female. 
 
** See questionnaire in APPENDIX B for descriptions of each AC action to assess fraud 
risk. 
 
The model is significant (F = 2.39, p = 0.010), and the R2 is 20.5 percent. The coefficient  
of PSCEO (p = 0.002) is significant and negative, and the coefficients of PTOID (p = 
0.011) and LOGACSIZE (p = 0.026) are significant and positive. Thus, the existence of a 
personal tie between the AC member and the CEO, reduces the AC’s tendency to engage 
in activities to assess FFR risk. On the other hand, the existence of an AC member’s 
professional tie to other independent directors, and the larger the size of the AC, the more 
likely the AC is to engage in AC activities to assess FFR risk. The findings for the 
relationship ties (e.g., PSCEO and PTOID) are consistent with the literature which has 
found that personal ties are corrosive to good corporate governance (e.g., Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2011;  
Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012), but professional ties are not (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 
2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012). The finding that larger ACs are associated with greater 
AC actions to assess fraud risk supports the argument that a larger AC may bring 
additional director expertise and knowledge to the board (Krishnan et al., 2011; Sharma 
& Iselin, 2012) and also indicates an absence of AC members “freeriding” (e.g., Krisnhan 
et al., 2011).  
 In Table 6, Panel B (shown below), I examine the relationship between the AC’s 
own actions to assess management’s integrity (SUMMIACTIONS) and the existence of 





Table 6- Panel B 
Regression Results  
DV = AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS MANAGEMENT’S INTEGRITY 
(SUMMIACTIONS)** 
 EXCLUDING AUDITORS 
n = 133 
Variable
15
 Predicted Sign Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 324.55 8.26 0.000* 
PSCEO - (H3a) -37.50 -2.09 0.020* 
PTCEO - (H3b) -23.64 -1.36 0.088* 
PSCFO - (H3a) 36.96 2.53 0.013* 
PTCFO - (H3b) -2.67 -0.17 0.433 
PSOAC +/- (H3c) -22.13 -1.06 0.290 
PTOAC +/- (H3c) 5.61 0.34 0.734 
PSOID +/- (H3c) -43.55 -1.67 0.098* 
PTOID +/- (H3c) 24.74 2.13 0.035* 
BODPCTIND ? 122.47 2.74 0.007* 
LOGACSIZE ? 33.68 0.83 0.410 
GENDER ? -29.12 -2.51 0.013* 








F-statistic 3.28  
 p < 0.001 
 




SUMMIACTIONS =   calculated variable = MIBODY+MIOPEN+MIPRESS+ 
   MIDEFEN+MIWHISTLE measuring the sum of specific  
  AC actions performed to assess management’s integrity 
   with each item measured on a 101 point scale anchored  
  0 = not at all and 100 = a great deal (possible total score  
  range 0-500). 
 
** See questionnaire in APPENDIX for descriptions of each AC action to 




 The VIF scores for all the variables are 1.77 or below, mean VIF = 1.34, indicating multicollinearity is 






actors, excluding the internal and external auditors, controlling for board independence, 
the natural log of audit committee size and gender. Specifically, I use the following 
model: 
 
 SUMMIACTIONS =                               
                                                   
                                        .  
 
The model is significant (F = 3.28, p < 0.001), and the    is 24.3 percent. The 
coefficients of PSCEO (p = 0.020) and GENDER (p = 0.013) are significant and 
negative, and the coefficients of PTCEO (p = 0.088) and PSOID (p = 0.098) are 
marginally significant and negative. The coefficients of PSCFO (p = 0.013), PTOID (p =  
0.035), and BODPCTIND (p = 0.007) are significant and positive. Thus, the existence of 
AC member personal and professional ties to the CEO, and personal ties to other 
independent directors, is associated with the AC being less likely to engage in activities 
to assess management’s integrity. However, the existence of AC members’ personal ties 
to the CFO and professional ties to other independent directors, female AC members, and 
AC members serving on boards with a higher percentage of independent directors are 
associated with the AC being more likely to take actions to assess management’s 
integrity.  
 These findings provide significant, new insights into the academic literature 
examining relationship ties. First, studies of relationship ties have primarily focused on  
director-CEO ties. I find only one study (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2011) that includes 





to both the CEO and CFO were corrosive to corporate oversight and associated with 
earnings management. The findings of the current study suggest that both AC personal 
and professional ties to the CEO are corrosive to AC oversight, and that the existence of 
AC personal ties to the CFO actually improve AC oversight. AC members with 
relationship ties to the CEO may ultimately feel beholden to the CEO for their 
appointment to the board (e.g., Ramamoorti, 2008; Westphal, 1999). Further, AC 
members may be influenced by high CEO power, which can decrease AC effectiveness 
(e.g., Lisic et al., 2012). Additional analysis revealed no association between the proxy 
variables for CEO power and AC actions to assess fraud or management’s integrity.
16
 As 
such, the most plausible explanation for corrosive personal and professional AC ties to 
the CEO may be that AC members reciprocate to the CEO for appointment to the board 
of directors, regardless of relationship type.  
 Second, the finding that AC members’ with personal ties to the CFO are 
associated with greater AC oversight runs counter to the findings of previous studies that 
have differentiated between personal and professional ties (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 
2012, Chidambaran et al., 2012). These studies have found a negative association 
between personal ties and corporate governance quality, whereas my finding for ties to 
the CFO is in the opposite direction. This finding suggests that there are factors that 
influence AC members with personal ties to the CFO take more of an agency approach to 
AC oversight. A deeper examination of the association between the existence of AC 
personal ties to the CFO and components of AC actions to assess fraud and 
 
16
 I examined whether proxies for CEO power (e.g., the CEO is also the chairman of the board, the CEO is 
also the founder of the AC firm, and the participant’s board tenure is shorter than the CEO tenure) (e.g., 
Lisic et al., 2012) are significant in the models shown in Panels A and B of Table 6. None of these 





management’s integrity (Table 6, Panels E-F) reveals that AC members with personal ties 
to the CFO take a non-confrontational approach to fraud oversight by primarily 
monitoring the whistleblower hotline. The academic literature has documented that AC 
members may carry out their duties in a non-confrontational manner, or act as a 
facilitator between management and auditors, in order to maintain harmony on the board 
(Hunton & Rose, 2008). By actively monitoring the whistleblower hotline and allowing 
others to bring forth controversial information, AC members with personal ties to the 
CFO can possibly avoid risking their own personal or professional capital, or that of the 
CFO, with whom they are associated (e.g., Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Janis, 1982; Jensen, 
2006; Johnson, et al., 2011).  
 Third, AC personal and professional ties to other independent directors have not 
been included in the recent studies of relationship ties which have differentiated between 
personal and professional ties (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 
2012). The finding of this study that the existence of personal ties between AC members 
and other independent directors, but not professional ties, are corrosive to AC oversight is 
consistent with the previous literature and extends the literature to include AC-board 
relationship ties. This finding may also indicate that AC members build social capital 
through their personal ties which allows them to gain more influence (e.g., Stevenson & 
Radin, 2009). Thus, these AC members may engage in fewer AC actions to assess 
management’s integrity by enlisting the support or assistance of the other independent 
directors with whom they are personally connected. On the other hand, AC members with 
professional networks within the board are less likely to have bonds that are as deep as 





Chidambaran et al. (2012). As such, these AC members may be less able to enlist other 
directors to assist with the task of FFR oversight, or may choose not to do so, because of 
the AC members’ concern for their personal or professional reputation (e.g., Westphal, 
1999; Jensen, 2006) or to avoid jeopardizing their board seats. This explanation would be 
supported by the finding in this study that AC members rely least on other independent 
directors to assess fraud risk (Table 2, Panel A). A deeper examination into the factors 
that drive AC members with personal and professional ties to act as they do may provide 
greater insight into the social capital/ human capital dynamic between board members.  
 Fourth, the finding that more independent boards are associated with greater AC 
actions to assess management’s integrity is consistent with previous literature linking AC 
independence to a lower likelihood of FFR (Beasley, 1996) and earnings manipulation 
(Dechow, 1996). However, previous studies of relationship ties argue that formally 
independent directors are not actually independent-minded and are ultimately beholden to 
management (e.g., Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hwang and Kim, 2009, 
2012; Krishnan et al., 2011). The results of this study indicate that formal (regulatory) 
independence is associated with greater AC actions to assess management’s integrity, but 
likewise, the study also finds that AC members with personal ties to the CEO are less 
likely to engage in actions to assess management’s integrity.  
 Finally, the finding that female AC members are more likely to report engaging in 
AC actions to assess management’s integrity is a potentially important finding in the 
study of AC oversight. This finding suggests that the inclusion of additional, qualified 
females on ACs may lead to better corporate governance. This sentiment is echoed by 





“more likely to be risk averse to frauds and opportunistic earning management” (p. 409). 
This issue of the gender composition of the AC should be of interest to other researchers, 
and those concerned with the quality of corporate governance.   
 In Table 6, Panel C (shown below), I examine the relationship between the AC’s 
own actions to assess FFR risk (SUMACACTIONS) and the existence of personal and 
professional ties to the CEO/CFO and the other corporate governance actors, including 
the internal and external auditors, controlling for board independence, the natural log of 
AC size and gender. Specifically, I use the following model: 
SUMACACTIONS =                               
                                                   
                                                  
           .  
The model is significant (F = 5.82, p< 0.001), and the    is 17.7 percent. The coefficient 
of PSCEO (p = 0.038) remains significant and negative, and the coefficient of PTOID (p 
= 0.088) remains marginally significant and positive. The coefficient of PTIA (p = 0.023) 
emerges as significant and positive, but LOGACSIZE (p = 0.158) is no longer 
significant. The emergence of professional ties to the head of internal audit as a 
significant relationship suggests these ties may possibly be associated with coalition 









Table 6- Panel C 
Regression Results  
DV = AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS FRAUD RISK    
(SUMACACTIONS) 
 INCLUDING AUDITORS 
n = 118 
Variable
17
 Predicted Sign Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 346.18 6.48 0.000* 
PSCEO - (H3a) -66.62 -1.80 0.038* 
PTCEO - (H3b) 6.90 0.31 0.753 
PSCFO - (H3a) 28.80 0.85 0.399 
PTCFO - (H3b) -9.62 -0.27 0.394 
PSOAC +/- (H3c) -13.88 -0.42 0.673 
PTOAC +/- (H3c) -23.11 -1.05 0.295 
PSOID +/- (H3c) -46.66 -1.37 0.173 
PTOID +/- (H3c) 32.78 1.72 0.088* 
PTIA +/- (H3c) 89.98 2.31 0.023* 
PTEAP +/- (H3c) 17.97 0.77 0.442 
BODPCTIND ? 82.70 1.28 0.205 
LOGACSIZE ? 82.56 1.42 0.158 
GENDER ? -7.52 -0.38 0.702 








F-statistic 5.82  
 p < 0.001 
 
* Significant p-values. 
 
 In Table 6, Panel D (shown below), I examine the relationship between the AC’s 
own actions to assess management’s integrity (SUMMIACTIONS) and the existence of 
personal and professional ties to the CEO/CFO and the other corporate governance 
actors, including the internal and external auditors, and controlling for board 




 The VIF scores for all the variables are 1.87 or below, mean VIF = 1.43, indicating multicollinearity is 






 Table 6- Panel D 
Regression Results  
DV = AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS MANAGEMENT’S INTEGRITY 
(SUMMIACTIONS) 
 INCLUDING AUDITORS 
n = 119 
Variable
18
 Predicted Sign Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 315.41 6.75 0.000* 
PSCEO - (H3a) -28.14 -1.16 0.126 
PTCEO - (H3b) -26.42 -1.37 0.087* 
PSCFO - (H3a) 39.23 2.19 0.031* 
PTCFO - (H3b) -6.66 -0.40 0.343 
PSOAC +/- (H3c) -32.02 -1.32 0.189 
PTOAC +/- (H3c) 15.56 0.90 0.371 
PSOID +/- (H3c) -40.73 -1.56 0.121 
PTOID +/- (H3c) 17.11 1.33 0.186 
PTIA +/- (H3c) 8.49 0.25 0.806 
PTEAP +/- (H3c) -54.09 -3.33 0.001* 
BODPCTIND ? 143.75 2.75 0.007* 
LOGACSIZE ? 21.63 0.51 0.613 
GENDER ? -28.67 -2.33 0.022* 








F-statistic 3.21  
 p < 0.001 
 
* Significant p-values. 
 
SUMMIACTIONS =                               
                                                   
                                                  











The model is significant (F = 3.21, p < 0.001), and the    is 28.4 percent. The   
coefficients of PSCEO (p = 0.126), PSOID (p = 0.121) and PTOID (p = 0.186) are no 
longer significant, but PTCEO (p = 0.087) remains marginally significant and GENDER 
(p = 0.022) remains significant and negative. The coefficient of PTEAP (p = 0.001) 
emerges as significant and negative, and the coefficients of PSCFO (p = 0.031), and  
BODPCTIND (p = 0.007) remain significant and positive. These findings, as well as the 
emergence of a negative association between the existence of professional ties to the 
external audit partner, suggest that the AC defers to the external audit partner to assess 
management’s integrity. Plausible explanations for this phenomenon may be that AC 
members perceive that the external audit partner is more capable of assessing 
management’s integrity, consistent with the concept of inter-rater reliability (e.g., Arnold 
& Sutton, 1997). In addition, AC members perceive that the external audit partner would 
normally perform this task as part of the external audit, which is consistent with AC 
members views that the audit partner has a fiduciary responsibility to carry out this task 
(see Table 3, Panel A). However, female AC members, AC members with personal ties to 
the CFO, and AC members with a higher percentage of independent directors on the 
board, appear to be committed to the task of AC actions to assess management’s integrity 
regardless of the presence of professional ties to the external audit partner or the head of 
internal audit.           
Specific AC Actions  
  In Table 6, Panel E (shown below), I include a summary of additional 
associations found between test and control variables and individual measures of AC 





 Table 6- Panel E 
Regression Results  
DV = SPECIFIC AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS FRAUD RISK  
(COMPONENTS OF SUMACACTIONS) 
EXCLUDING AUDITORS   
n = 132 
 

















































































Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
* Significant p-values.   
 
** All regression models presented in this table were significant at p < 0.05. 
   
 a more micro view of which test or control variable(s) is (are) driving specific AC actions 
to assess fraud risk. The results indicate several interesting patterns. 
  First, I find that overall, AC members with personal ties to the CEO (PSCEO has 
a negative and significant coefficient) are less likely to engage in actions that are directly 
associated with detecting FFR (e.g., closely analyzing reserves, actively promoting the 
company’s whistleblower hotline, and actively searching for fraud risk). This finding 
suggests that these AC members may serve in a largely ceremonial roles, consistent with 





passive directors, who are reliant on information from the CEO, consistent with 
managerial hegemony theory (e.g., Cohen et al., 2007b). 
  Second, I find that female AC members are more likely to report assessing fraud 
risk through two specific avenues: assessing the character of management (GENDER, 
coefficient = -5.36, p = 0.002) and actively searching for fraud risks (GENDER, 
coefficient = -9.84, p = 0.046). This is an important finding as CEOs and CFOs are more 
likely to be associated with incidences of FFR (Beasley et al., 1999, 2010). From a 
theoretical perspective, female AC members may be more capable of subjectively 
assessing management’s character than male AC members, because female AC members 
may be less likely to be of the same gender as management, given the small percentage of 
females on ACs, and the assumption that the CEO and/or the CFO is (are) more likely to 
be male(s). This explanation would be consistent with the premise of homophily 
(McPherson et al., 2001), by suggesting that a lack of homophily, or similarities between 
female AC members and management, is associated with greater arms-length monitoring. 
This explanation would also be consistent with the underlying theoretical framework of 
previous archival and experimental studies of relationship ties (e.g., Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a; Dey & Liu, 2011; 
Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang and Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan et al., 
2011). I did not specifically ask respondents to indicate the gender of the CEO or CFO, 
but future research could include these variables.     
  Third, I find that AC members with personal ties to the CFO (PSCFO, coefficient 
= 22.62, p = 0.002) take an arguably unique approach to assessing fraud risk by primarily 





to assess FFR risk. This strategy may allow these AC members to avoid losing personal 
and professional capital by avoiding confrontation that could impair their status (Bédard 
& Gendron, 2010; Janis, 1982; Jensen, 2006; Johnson, et al., 2011) or lead to potentially 
being marginalized or ostracized by either management or other board members 
(Westphal & Khanna, 2003). By primarily promoting the whistleblower hotline, AC 
members with personal ties to the CFO may not only adhere to communal norms of the 
board (e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), but also may protect their own personal status, as 
well as that of the CFO, with whom they are associated. In addition, these AC members 
may actually enhance fraud oversight as whistleblowers often are likely to discover 
fraudulent activity (Dyck, et al., 2010). Whether AC members with personal ties to the 
CFO are more motivated to promote the whistleblower hotline because of adherence to 
board communal norms, concerns about personal status, or because of other motivations 
is a question that should be of interest to researchers.    
  Finally, among the other significant variables presented , I find that although the 
existence of AC professional ties to the CEO (PTCEO) are not significantly associated 
with overall AC actions to assess fraud risk (p > 0.05), there is a marginally positive 
association (coefficient = 7.88, p = 0.093) between these ties and the AC actively 
searching for fraud risk. This association may suggest that these AC members are 
concerned, to an extent, about their reputational capital, and are not entirely passive. 
Likewise, AC members with professional ties to other independent directors (PTOID) 
may have similar reputational concerns, but these directors engage in more specific 
actions to assess FFR risk by either analyzing reserves and financial statements 





13.36, p = 0.000). On the other hand, AC members with professional ties to other audit 
committee members (PTOAC) do not act in a similar manner, and actually are less likely 
to engage in specific AC actions to monitor the whistleblower hotline (coefficient = -
12.33, p = 0.037). This finding may suggest that these AC members defer to others on the 
AC who they believe are more capable of carrying out this task. Finally, larger ACs are 
positively associated with specific AC actions to monitor the whistleblower hotline 
(LOGACSIZE, coefficient = 37.70, p = 0.031) and to actively search for fraud risk 
(LOGACSIZE, coefficient = 50.08, p = 0.002). Larger ACs may bring additional director 
expertise and knowledge to the board (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2011; Sharma & Iselin, 
2012). As such, these ACs may be more capable of carrying out these tasks than smaller 
ACs.   
  In Table 6, Panel F (shown below), I include a summary of additional associations 
found between test and control variables and individual measures of AC actions to assess 
management’s integrity (components of SUMMIACTIONS). These findings provide a 
more micro view of which test or control variable(s) is (are) driving specific AC actions 
to assess management’s integrity. These results also indicate several interesting patterns.  
  First, the corrosive influence of AC personal or professional ties to the CEO is 
fairly pervasive across the AC actions to assess management’s integrity (PSCEO or 
PTCEO is negative and significant). AC members with these ties are less likely to assess 
management’s body language (coefficient = -6.88, p = 0.075), less likely to observe 
management’s openness/transparency (coefficient = -3.68, p = 0.092), and less likely to 






Table 6- Panel F 
Regression Results 
DV = SPECIFIC AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS MANAGEMENT’S 
INTEGRITY  
(COMPONENTS OF SUMMIACTIONS)  
EXCLUDING AUDITORS 
n = 133 
 





































































































Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
* Significant p-values. 
 
** All regression models presented in this table were significant at p < 0.05. 
 
 members are less inclined to assess management’s integrity. As such, these AC members’ 
role in carrying out this taks maybe be largely ceremonial.  
  Second, the association between gender (GENDER) and specific AC actions to 
assess management’s integrity is significant and negative across nearly all AC actions 
with the exception of monitoring the whistleblower hotline. This finding suggests that 





efforts. Female AC members may be driven by a sense of fiduciary responsibility, or are 
more risk averse to fraud and other opportunistic behavior (Man & Wong, 2013, p. 409). 
A deeper examination of how female AC members approach their AC oversight duties 
could potentially provide a deeper understanding of AC processes.           
  Third, AC members with personal ties to the CFO (PSCFO) take much the same 
approach to assessing management’s integrity as they do toward assessing FFR risk by 
primarily focusing on maintaining the whistleblower hotline (coeffcient = 22.24, p = 
0.028). These AC members also assess whether management is defensive (coefficient = 
10.78, p = 0.031), but this AC action is an observation that may not be perceived by 
management as a challenge. Whether these AC members act quietly in order to maintain 
their own status on the board, or to protect the CFO with whom they are associated, 
might be a topic of interest to future researchers.  
 Fourth, I find that greater board independence (BODPCTIND) is positive and 
significantly (p < 0.05) associated with AC members observing management’s body 
language and openness/transparency, and monitoring the whistleblower hotline. These 
findings suggest that more independent boards not only observe management, but 
actively assess management’s integrity via the whistleblower hotline. Previous studies of 
relationship ties (e.g., Hwang and Kim, 2009, 2012) suggest that CEOs appoint their 
friends to the board of directors to circumvent SOX independence rules. The finding here 
suggests that board independence is still an important indicator of AC fraud oversight 
even if corrosive personal and professional ties between AC members and CEO are 





 Finally, I find that AC members with personal ties to other AC members 
(PSOAC) are less likely to assess management’s body language (coefficient = -10.79, p = 
0.061); AC members with personal ties to other independent directors (PSOID) are less 
likely to observe how management reacts in pressure situations (coefficient =  
-8.53, p = 0.095); and AC members with professional ties to other independent directors 
(PTOID) are more likely to monitor the whistleblower hotline (coefficient = 14.25, p = 
0.001). These findings are consistent with the significant relationships presented in Table 
6, Panel B and Panel D, with the exception of personal ties to other AC members 
(PSOAC). PSOAC was not signicantly associated with AC actions to assess  
management’s integrity and the finding that this variable is only associated with 
observing management’s body language suggests that the implications of the finding may 
be limited. 
 Overall, the differences between the findings presented in the alternative analyses 
of hypotheses H3a, H3b, and H3c and those found in previous archival studies may be 
attibuted to the difficulty of the task of assessing FFR risk. AC fraud oversight is a  
difficult task, and one that many AC members appear to struggle with (Beasley et al. 
2009). As such, AC members may rely on certain relationship ties to gain additional 
expertise and knowledge to carry out this task. AC members may not have to rely on 
these same relationship ties to carry out less demanding oversight tasks. Thus, certain 
relationship ties may be significant for fraud oversight, but not for other tasks associated 
with accounting outcomes.  
 This view is supported by the previous academic literature that posits that 





2006). Thus, AC members may develop different strategies for assessing FFR risk 
depending on AC members’ perceptions of the strength of their own abilities (self-
insight) and the abilities of other corporate governance actors (inter-rater reliability) in 
order to perceive that they are accountable, and to maintain their status on the board.   
Such concerns are likely warranted. The CAQ (2013) documented that other corporate 
governance actors have expectations that AC members will have sufficient financial 
literacy, expertise, and knowledge of industry and business processes and be capable of 
asking probing questions of management. As such, AC members may be cognizant of 
these expectations and thus utilize their relationship ties in a manner that is unique in the 






CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper, I use survey data to examine the association between AC members’ 
personal and professional ties and (a) AC members’ reliance on the CEO/CFO to assess 
fraud risk, and (b) AC members’ reliance on their own efforts to assess fraud risk. The 
results from a sample of 136 AC members from mid-sized U.S. public companies 
indicate no association between AC members’ personal or professional relationship ties 
to management or other corporate governance actors, and AC members’ reliance on these 
actors to assess fraud risk. However, I do find links between the AC’s own actions to 
assess fraud risk and (a) personal ties to the CEO/CFO and professional ties to other 
corporate governance actors, and (b) certain control variables including board of director 
independence, AC size, and respondent gender. The overall findings both confirm and 
challenge the findings of recent archival studies that have considered different forms of 
relationship ties (e.g. Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidbambaran et al., 2012; Cohen 
et al., 2012a).  
 Specifically, I find that AC members with personal ties to the CEO and other 
independent directors, and professional ties to the CEO and the external audit partner, are 
less likely to engage in actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. On the 
other hand, I find that AC members with personal ties to the CFO and professional ties to 





AC actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. Further, I find that female 
AC members are more likely to report and engage in activities to assess management’s 
integrity. I also find that AC size and board independence are positively associated with 
AC actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. In addition, the results 
provide insights about how AC members delegate their fraud oversight duties, and reveal 
that AC members generally perceive that management, and internal and external auditors, 
are more responsible for assessing fraud risk than the AC, or other independent directors.  
The study’s findings have important implications for researchers, practitioners, 
and policymakers. From a research perspective, first, this study supports and extends 
previous research by Beasley et al. (2009) by confirming that AC members often lack 
consensus about how to assess fraud risk and showing how relationship ties and 
governance variables are associated with variations in specific AC actions to assess fraud 
risk.  
Second, this study both supports and challenges previous findings in the emerging 
line of research that considers the different forms of relationship ties (e.g. Bruynseels & 
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidbambaran et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a). The findings confirm 
that most AC personal ties have a corrosive influence on AC actions, but suggest that 
professional ties can be corrosive, as well. In addition, the study finds that certain 
personal ties can actually enhance AC oversight. These findings suggest that some AC 
members with personal or professional ties to the CEO may serve in largely ceremonial 
roles, or serve as passive directors obtaining their information through management, 
consistent with institutional and managerial hegemony theory. These AC members may 





reasons. As such, these AC members may perceive that they are primarily accountable to 
the CEO, and thus, they are less inclined to be both monitors of, and advice givers to, 
management, which is not consistent with the concept of a “collaborative board” (e.g., 
Westphal, 1999). On the other hand, AC members with personal ties to the CFO may 
enhance AC oversight which supports Westphal’s (1999, p. 7) finding that “a lack of 
social independence can increase board involvement and firm performance”. However, 
the finding does not support a previous research finding that director-CFO ties are 
negatively associated with earnings management (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2011). But, 
fraudulent financial reporting represents an extreme case of earnings management (e.g., 
Kalbers, 2009). As such, the two studies may not be fully comparable. Thus, further 
research differentiating CEO and CFO personal and professional ties, and AC actions, or 
corporate governance outcomes, may be warranted. In addition, future research focusing 
on the motivations of AC members with personal ties to the CFO might provide 
additional insight about how these AC members carry out their duties.  
Third, the results provide an important finding that female AC members are more 
likely to engage in actions to assess management’s integrity. This finding is consistent 
with a line of research finding that female directors are more risk averse to fraud and 
opportunistic earnings management (Man & Wong, 2013). As such, further research 
more deeply examining how female AC members approach fraud oversight might 
provide additional insights about the finding of this study.    
From a practitioner perspective, the study has several important ramifications. 
First, this study confirms the findings of several other studies (e.g., Bruynseels & 





Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan et al., 2011) that personal relationship ties to the 
CEO are associated with weaker corporate governance, but also suggests that 
professional ties can be corrosive as well. Thus, public corporations should consider 
asking nominees for board service to disclose any personal or professional relationship 
ties to management that go beyond the formal board independence (SOX) requirements. 
Second, this finding underscores the importance of minimizing CEO influence over the 
board nominating process (e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) as there is continuing evidence 
that CEOs influence this process (e.g., Clune et al., 2013). Third, public corporations may 
want to more actively identify qualified females for AC service to bring a different and 
potentially more skeptical perspective to the AC, and the board as a whole. Finally, the 
results of this study suggest that AC members have widely varying views of fraud risk 
responsibility and reasons for relying on other corporate governance actors. This also 
holds true for other corporate governance actors (e.g., CAQ, 2013). These findings 
underscore the need to encourage open communications among the actors in the 
corporate governance mosaic and to clearly define each corporate actor’s role in 
assessing fraud risk.      
From a policy viewpoint, regulators should take some comfort knowing that board 
independence is positively associated with FFR risk oversight. However, as research in 
this area advances, regulators may wish to consider requiring directors to disclose 
personal and professional ties, or the lack thereof. Such disclosures would not be 
cumbersome to implement and would provide additional transparency not only to 





 This study, like all studies, is subject to limitations. First, there was some “noise” 
in the measurements of personal and professional ties, but I collected written descriptions 
of the ties so as to fully understand each tie. A few respondents (n = 6) misinterpreted 
survey definitions of personal and professional ties and recorded their responses in the 
wrong place in the survey. As such, I analyzed their textual descriptions of the ties to 
recode their responses to reflect the correct type of relationship tie.
19
 Some judgement 
was required, but the descriptions in all the responses were very clear, and overall, this 
was not a pervasive issue within the data. Second, fewer AC members than expected 
reported personal or professional ties to management or other corporate governance 
actors. Other recent qualitative corporate governance studies have documented that many 
AC members (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009) and board directors (e.g., Clune et al., 2013) had 
existing personal or professional ties to management or other board directors before 
joining the board, and prior ties are a strong indicator of current ties (Stevenson & Radin, 
2009). I expected such ties to carry over to current AC service. Participants may have 
been reluctant to divulge what they might consider to be sensitive information, or they 
may have perceived that documenting each relationship tie would be too time consuming.  
Third, the results may not be generalizable to all industries. Previous research (e.g., 
Beasley et al., 1999, 2000, 2010) indicated that certain industries are more prone to 
incidences of FFR. As such, AC composition may be associated with agency concerns on 
the part of external stakeholders and thus, influence the types of relationship ties between 
the AC and management. The industry distribution of the respondents’ AC firms (Table 
 
19
 For each model presented in Table 6, Panels A-D, I performed additional statistical analysis by (a) 
adding a “recoded response” variable to the model (= 1 if the response was recoded, else = 0), and (b) 
dropping the recoded responses. The “recoded response” variable was insignificant in all cases. I also found 





1, Panel C) was broad, but this does not preclude the possibility that the results are not 
generalizable to all industries.   
The ramifications of fraudulent financial reporting can potentially be devastating, 
and the AC plays a key role in safeguarding investors’ interests. This study attempts to 
identify relationship links between AC members and other corporate governance actors to 
better understand how those links affect actual AC actions and to better understand how 
perceptions of reliance and responsibility play a role in how AC members assess fraud 
risk. Future research diving deeper into these issues could provide an even more complete 
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robertwilbanksksu@gmail.com or me at dhermans@kennesaw.edu. Thank you very much for 





Dana R. Hermanson 







Dana R. Hermanson 
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise 
dhermans@kennesaw.edu 
770.423.6077 
SECOND REQUEST - July 18, 2013 
 
<<Title>> <<First Name>> <<Middle Name>> <<Last Name>> 
<<Position>> 
<<Company>> 
<<Bus Street 1>> 
<<Bus Street 2>> 
<<City>>, <<State>> <<Zip>> 
 
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>: 
 
If you responded to our previous mailing in June 2013, thank you very much for your help, and please 
disregard this letter. If you did not respond, we ask that you please consider assisting us with this 
important research by taking approximately 15-25 minutes to complete the enclosed case. We will 
conclude the data collection by August 8, 2013. 
 
As you know, the role of audit committee members is quite complex and often challenging. My doctoral 
student, Robert Wilbanks, is working on his dissertation, in which he is seeking to better understand audit 
committee members’ judgments. Dr. Vineeta Sharma (Kennesaw State University) and I are overseeing 
Robert’s research, and we are both experienced accounting researchers. Robert is an experienced CPA and 
CFO with experience interacting with board members (see http://www.linkedin.com /in/ robwilbanks). 
 
You are among a select group of audit committee members we are contacting to ask for assistance with 
Robert’s dissertation research. Your participation is very important to the success of the project and to gain 
a better understanding of the issues and challenges that audit committee members confront in practice. We 
certainly hope you will contribute a few minutes of your time to help us in this area. 
 
We ask that you read the enclosed questionnaire and respond to all of the questions that follow using the 
directions provided in the questionnaire. This is not a test, and there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. We 
are interested in your candid views. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to 
link you to your responses, and all data will be reported in the aggregate only. The project has been 
approved by our Institutional Review Board. 
 
Completion of the case should take approximately 15-25 minutes. If you have any questions or would like 
to receive a summary of the results, please either email Robert at robertwilbanksksu@gmail.com or me at 





Dana R. Hermanson 










Audit Committee Member Judgments 
 
This study is part of my research requirement to earn my Doctorate in Business 
Administration (DBA) at Kennesaw State University. This purpose of the study is 
intended to help improve our understanding of the challenges faced by audit committees 
today. 
 
Your position and expertise make your opinions and evaluations very important to this 
study. The study consists of a questionnaire regarding your service on the largest public 
company on whose audit committee you have served for at least one year. The estimated 
time for completion is approximately 15-25 minutes. 
 
Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your consent 
(or skip a question) at any time without penalty. Additionally, your individual results will 
be anonymous (all data will be reported in the aggregate only). There are no known risks 
anticipated because of taking part in this study. You must be at least 18 years of age to 
participate in this study. 
 
If you have any questions about the study you can contact me using the information 
below. Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried 
out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems 
regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, 
Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, 
(678) 797-2268. 
 
Thank you in advance for your time and assistance. Your response is greatly appreciated. 
 
 











1. The pages that follow contain a questionnaire. 
 
2. Please complete the materials in the order given without looking ahead through 
the pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in 
a way that reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable 
response, please complete all of the questions. You will have an opportunity at the 
end of the questionnaire to provide any clarifications or comments you would like to 
make. 
 
3. You are anonymous during this study. No effort will be made to link you to your 






Robert Wilbanks, CPA 
Tennessee Technological University 
Doctoral Student – Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University 
robertwilbanksksu@gmail.com 





Dana Hermanson, Ph.D. (Chair) 
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair & 
Professor 
Coles College of Business 
Kennesaw State University 
dhermans@kennesaw.edu 
(770) 423-6077 
Vineeta D. Sharma, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor 
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A. Reliance When Assessing Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) 
 
 When assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting in this company, to what 
extent do you rely upon each party listed below? (Indicate your answers with a slash 
on the horizontal lines below): 
       No                       Total 
       Reliance                               Reliance 
 
1. Chief Executive Officer  |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
  
2. Chief Financial Officer   |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|  
 
3. Other audit committee members |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
 
4. Yourself    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
 
5. Other independent directors   
 (not on the audit committee)  |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|  
 
6.  The head of internal audit    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
     
7. The external audit partner in charge       
 of this engagement   |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
 










Please respond by considering the largest public company on whose audit committee you 
have served for at least one year. Please answer all of the questions in this survey with 
respect to ONLY that company. Please do not name the company, and I will make no effort 
to identify the company. 
 
For purposes of this study, the term “fraudulent financial reporting” represents the 
intentional material misstatement of financial statements or financial disclosures or the 








B. Perceptions of Responsibility for Assessing Risk of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting (FFR) 
 
 What is your perception of the responsibility of each party listed below for 
assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting in this company? (Indicate your 
answers with a slash on the lines below): 
 
       No                     Total 
       Responsibility   Responsibility 
 
1. Chief Executive Officer  |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|  
  
2. Chief Financial Officer   |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|  
 
3. Other audit committee members |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
 
4. Yourself    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
 
5. Other independent directors  
 (not on the audit committee)   |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|  
 
6. The head of internal audit                  |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|  
 
7. The external audit partner in charge     
    of this engagement   |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
 
 For the parties above with high responsibility, what is your reason for assigning 
























II. Audit Committee Actions to Assess Risk of FFR 
  
 Please rate the extent to which the audit committee of this company engages in its 
own actions to assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. This audit committee 
(indicate your answers with a slash on the lines below): 
                      
1. Closely analyzes reserves and other financial statement areas where fraud could 
occur. 
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                  Not at All     A Great Deal                
 
2. Assesses the character of management. 
  
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                  Not at All     A Great Deal                
            
3. Has regular interactions with management. 
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                  Not at All     A Great Deal                
               
4. Actively promotes the company’s whistleblower hotline.  
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                  Not at All     A Great Deal              
 
5. Actively searches for fraud risks. 
  
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                  Not at All     A Great Deal                
 
 6. Reviews officers’ expenses (annually) to assess financial statement fraud risks. 
   
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                  Not at All     A Great Deal                
 
7. Please describe any other means that the audit committee of this company uses to 














III. Audit Committee Actions to Assess/Monitor Management Integrity 
 
 Please rate the extent to which the audit committee of this company assesses and 
monitors management’s integrity. This audit committee (indicate your answers 
with a slash on the lines below): 
  
1. Assesses management’s body language.  
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
             Not at All A Great Deal           
 
2. Observes management’s transparency/openness.   
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
             Not at All     A Great Deal 
 
3. Observes how management reacts in pressure situations.  
  
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                       Not at All     A Great Deal 
                         
4. Observes whether management is defensive.  
   
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                        Not at All     A Great Deal 
 
5. Monitors the whistleblower hotline.  
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                       Not at All     A Great Deal 
 
6. Please describe any other means that the audit committee of this company uses to 





























“Professional ties” refer to instances where you and another individual have interacted in 
a business capacity in a meaningful way, separate from your service on this company’s 
board and audit committee. Such interactions may include: 
 
 You serve(d) together on another company’s board. 
 You serve(d) together on a not-for-profit board. 
 You worked together at another company or organization (including cases where 
one party was an executive and the other was a board member). 
 You had a supplier-customer relationship, or a service provider-client relationship 
(external auditor, outside counsel, consultant, etc.). 
 You are a former employee of this company. 
 You knew each other well through professional organizations. 
 
Do you have any professional ties to the following parties (other than your service on 
this company’s board)?  
 
1.  The CEO 
 Yes, I have professional ties to this person. 
 No, I do not have professional ties to this person. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie  
(indicate your answer with a slash on the line below): 
   
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 






Please respond using the same company for your frame of reference that you used on the 
previous pages - the largest public company on whose audit committee you have served for 








2. The CFO 
 Yes, I have professional ties to this person. 
 No, I do not have professional ties to this person. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie: 
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 
               
3.   Other audit committee members 
 Yes, I have professional ties to other audit committee members.  
  No, I do not have professional ties to other audit committee members. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of your strongest tie to another audit committee 
member: 
 
      |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 
               
4.   Other independent directors (not on the audit committee) 
 Yes, I have professional ties to other independent directors 
 (not on the audit committee).  
 No, I do not have professional ties to other independent directors 
 (not on the audit committee). 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of your strongest tie to an independent director 
(not on the audit committee): 
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 








5.   The head of internal audit 
 Yes, I have professional ties to this person. 
 No, I do not have professional ties to this person. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie: 
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 
               
6.   The external audit partner in charge of this engagement 
 Yes, I have professional ties to this person. 
  No, I do not have professional ties to this person. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie: 
   
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 
 
 

































“Personal ties” refer to instances where you and another individual have or have had non-
business affiliations or interactions. Such affiliations or interactions may include: 
 
 You were college classmates or active together in an alumni group.  
 You are/were members of the same golf or social club, religious organization, or 
charitable organization. 
 You are long-term personal friends. 
 Your families are friends (e.g., children play together or attend school together). 
 You are related. 
 You live(d) in the same neighborhood. 
 You both served in the military. 
 You have any other types of common personal ties similar to those listed above. 
 
Do you have any personal ties to the following parties?  
 
     1.   The CEO 
 Yes, I have personal ties to this person. 
 No, I do not have personal ties to this person. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie 
(indicate your answer with a slash on the line below): 
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 





            
    
 
Please respond using the same company for your frame of reference that you used on the 
previous pages - the largest public company on whose audit committee you have served for 








2.   The CFO 
 Yes, I have personal ties to this person. 
 No, I do not have personal ties to this person. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie: 
   
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 
               
3. Other audit committee members 
 Yes, I have personal ties to other audit committee members. 
  No, I do not have personal ties to other audit committee members. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of your strongest tie to another audit committee 
member: 
   
      |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 
 
4. Other independent directors (not on the audit committee) 
 Yes, I have personal ties to other independent directors  
 (not on the audit committee).  
 No, I do not have personal ties to other independent directors  
 (not on the audit committee).  
 





If yes, please rate your perception of your strongest tie to an independent director 
(not on the audit committee): 
 
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 









5.   The head of internal audit 
 Yes, I have personal ties to this person. 
 No, I do not have personal ties to this person. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie: 
   
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 
 
6. The external audit partner in charge of this engagement 
 Yes, I have personal ties to this person. 
  No, I do not have personal ties to this person. 
 





If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie: 
   
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
                Very Weak Tie         Very Strong Tie 
 
 




























A.  Demographic Questions 
 
1. What is your gender?  
  Male 
  Female 
 
2. What is your age? __________    
   
3.  Please indicate which of the following applies to you (choose one). 
   Corporate director, employed full-time by another organization      
   Corporate director, not employed full-time  
 
4. Please provide your current job title if employed full-time: __________________ 
    
5. Please indicate below any professional certifications you have (choose all that 
apply).  
  Certified Financial Manager (CFM) 
  Certified Management Accountant (CMA) 
    Certified Public Accountant (CPA) 
  Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA)  
  Other ____________________ 
  
6. Please indicate below any professional experience in finance or accounting you 
have (choose all that apply).  
  Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
  Public accounting  
    General management 
  Accounting professor  
   Controller 
  Financial / accounting regulator 
  Other ____________________ 
 
7. How many total years of financial or accounting experience do you have?______ 
 
8. Please indicate your highest educational degree.  
  Bachelor’s degree 
  Masters degree 
    JD 
  PhD/DBA  
  Other ____________________ 
Please respond to the following questions. These will be used only to analyze the results, 






B.  Company Characteristics 
 
1. Please indicate the approximate annual revenues (in millions) of the company on 
whose audit committee you serve (the focal company in this survey) (choose 
one).  
   Less than $10 million  
    $10 million to $50 million    
  $51 million to $100 million    
  $101 million to $200 million    
  $201 million to $300 million    
    $301 million to $400 million    
  $401 million to $500 million     
  $501 million to $1 billion        
  Over $1 billion    
 
2. Please indicate the industry group of the company on whose audit committee 
you serve (the focal company in this survey) (choose one).  
   Communication/Media  
  Energy/Utilities  
    Finance/Banking  
  Government/Education   
  Healthcare/Pharmaceuticals  
  Insurance  
    Manufacturing  
  Real Estate   
  Retail Trade  
  Service Organization 
    Technology 
  Telecommunications   
  Transportation/Logistics  
  Wholesale Trade  
    Other ________________ 
 
3. Is this company audited by one of the “Big 4” accounting firms?  
  Yes 
  No 
 
4. Is this company’s internal audit function primarily “in-house” or outsourced? 
 (Choose one)  
  In-house 
  Outsourced 
  Both in-house and outsourced (co-sourced) 








5. To whom does the internal audit function report in this company? (Choose one)  
  Primarily to the audit committee 
  Primarily to management 
  About equally to the audit committee and management 
  Not applicable 
 
C. Audit Committee Member Service 
 
1. Are you formally designated as an “audit committee financial expert” for this 
company?  
  Yes 
  No 
 
 2. Are you the audit committee chair for this company?   
  Yes 
  No 
 
3. Do you have industry expertise in the same industry as that of this company?  
  Yes 
  No 
 
4. How many years have you served on the board of this company? __________ 
 
5. How many years have you served on the audit committee of this company?____ 
 
D.  Audit Committee Composition and Meeting Processes 
 
1. How many members serve on the audit committee of this company? __________ 
 
2. How many members of the audit committee are designated as “audit committee 
financial experts”? __________ 
 
3. How many years has the chair of the audit committee served as chair?__________ 
 
4. How many formal audit committee meetings (face-to-face, video conferencing, or 
telephone) are held each year? __________ 
 
E.  Other Audit Committee Experience 
 
1. On how many public company audit committees do you currently serve 
(including this company)? __________ 
 
2. How many public company audit committees have you served on during your 






3. For how many years have you served on at least one public company audit 
committee? __________ 
 
4. Have you ever served on an audit committee (public or private) at the time the 
company experienced fraudulent financial reporting? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
F. Governance Characteristics  
 
1. How many directors serve on the full board of this company? __________ 
 
2. How many independent directors serve on the full board of this company?_____ 
 
3. Is the CEO also the chairman of the board of this company?   
  Yes 
  No 
 
4. Is the CEO also the founder of this company?   
  Yes 
  No 
 
5. Was the current CEO in place when you were appointed to the board?   
  Yes 
  No 
 
6. How many years has the CEO of this company been in office? __________ 
 
7. How many years has the CFO of this company been in office? __________ 
 










Thank you very much for completing the survey. If you would like a summary of 
the study’s results, please email the researcher. 
 
 
 
 
